

**Structural Suffocation and Asymmetric Judgment: The Cuban Embargo as Paradigm in the Political Economy of Coercion**

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**Abstract**

This study examined the structural mechanisms and asymmetric normative frameworks through which comprehensive economic sanctions, using the United States embargo against Cuba (1962–present) as the primary paradigmatic case, function as instruments of political coercion in the contemporary international order. Drawing on a cross-national dataset of 63 sanctioned states spanning the period 1990–2023, the study employed a multi-method quantitative approach integrating univariate descriptive statistics, bivariate Pearson correlation analysis, binary logistic regression modelling, and systematic data visualization to interrogate the relationships between coercion intensity, economic performance, human development outcomes, and the duration of sanction regimes. The principal findings revealed a statistically significant and strongly negative correlation between the Economic Coercion Index (ECI) and GDP per capita ( $r = -0.712$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), Human Development Index scores ( $r = -0.681$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), and trade volume as a proportion of GDP ( $r = -0.638$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), while demonstrating significant positive associations with poverty rates ( $r = 0.694$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and inflation ( $r = 0.521$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). The logistic regression model, which demonstrated strong predictive validity (AUC = 0.874; Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 0.612$ ), confirmed that coercion intensity, duration of sanctions, and GDP per capita were the most powerful independent predictors of severe economic contraction, controlling for trade openness and institutional repression. The comparative panel analysis across eight case states, including Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, demonstrated that comprehensive sanctions of prolonged duration uniformly produced the most severe socioeconomic outcomes, disproportionately affecting civilian populations rather than governing elites. The study concluded that the Cuban embargo, far from constituting a legitimate instrument of democratization or security coercion, operates as a structural mechanism of civilizational suffocation — reinforcing asymmetric international power relations and producing demonstrable human development deficits inconsistent with stated foreign policy objectives. The study recommended multilateral reform of sanctions governance frameworks, the introduction of binding humanitarian carve-out protocols, and the adoption of sunset clauses to enforce periodic evidence-based review of extended embargo regimes.

**Keywords:** *Cuban embargo, economic coercion, sanctions regimes, political economy, human development, asymmetric international relations, logistic regression, comparative sanctions analysis*

**INTRODUCTION**

The architecture of economic coercion has long occupied a contested terrain within international relations scholarship, oscillating between normative justifications rooted in liberal democratic promotion and structuralist critiques that expose such instruments as tools of hegemonic maintenance. At the apex of this contested terrain sits the United States' comprehensive economic embargo against Cuba, codified across a dense legislative lattice — including the Trading with the Enemy Act (1917), the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (1963), the Cuban Democracy Act (1992), the Helms-Burton Act (1996), and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (2000) — which collectively constitute the most protracted and comprehensive unilateral sanction regime in modern international history (Hickey

& Bukenya, 2021; Koskey et al., 2025). Initiated amid the geopolitical fever of the Cold War following the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and Fidel Castro's subsequent nationalization of United States-owned assets, the embargo has persisted across more than sixty years, surviving the collapse of its original ideological adversary and mutating from an anti-communist instrument into a self-sustaining foreign policy apparatus that resists empirical reckoning with its own outcomes (Breitinger, 2023; Kasirye, 2021; Öztuna, 2023). What renders the Cuban embargo paradigmatic is not merely its duration or severity, but its crystallization of a broader structural logic through which powerful states deploy economic isolation as a normalized instrument of coercion while simultaneously invoking universal human rights frameworks selectively — punishing ideological adversaries while shielding economically or strategically valuable partners from equivalent scrutiny (Başaran, 2025; Burke & Stephens, 2018; Obonyo & Muhumuza, 2023). This study, therefore, positioned the Cuban embargo not as an exceptional case but as a revelatory paradigm — a lens through which the political economy of coercion, the asymmetric production of international legitimacy, and the material consequences of sustained structural suffocation could be rigorously examined through a comparative, quantitative framework (Andrew, 2020; Fridahl, 2017; Möller & Doevenspeck, 2023). The study sought to contribute original empirical evidence to an underexplored intersection: the quantitative modeling of coercion's developmental consequences across a global sample of sanctioned states, thereby moving beyond ideographic case studies toward nomothetic generalizations with direct policy implications.

#### **BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY**

The scholarly literature on economic sanctions has evolved substantially since the landmark work of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990), whose expansive cross-national study suggested that sanctions succeeded in achieving their political objectives in approximately one-third of cases — a finding that, despite subsequent methodological challenges, has anchored much of the optimistic strand of sanctions scholarship (Moura et al., 2021; Taylor et al., 2021). However, this literature has progressively bifurcated: a structuralist and critical political economy tradition, represented by scholars such as Drezner (1999), Pape (1997), and more recently Gordon (2011) in the context of Cuba specifically, has mounted compelling evidence that comprehensive, long-duration sanctions rarely achieve their stated political objectives while reliably producing severe humanitarian consequences. The Cuban case is particularly instructive in this regard. The United States imposed its initial trade restrictions in 1960 following Cuba's nationalization of American properties, with a comprehensive embargo formalized in 1962, and subsequently escalated through a series of legislative enactments that progressively extraterritorialized the sanction regime — most controversially through the Helms-Burton Act's Title III provisions, which subjected third-country entities trading with Cuba to litigation in United States courts, drawing widespread condemnation from the European Union, Canada, and the broader international community (Iyamba & Yusuf, 2025; Meyerson, 2023; Nancy & Audrey, 2025). The United Nations General Assembly has voted annually since 1992 to condemn the embargo as a violation of international law and humanitarian norms, with votes in recent years achieving majorities of 185 or more nations against only two or three dissenting votes — a pattern of near-universal normative rejection that stands in stark asymmetric contrast to the embargo's continued legal operation (Julius & Kazaara, 2025; Macdonald et al., 2023; Zhang, 2025). Cuba's economic trajectory over this period offers a complex picture: while the Revolution achieved

early gains in health and education outcomes — producing life expectancy and infant mortality figures that rival those of more affluent nations — the combined weight of the embargo, the collapse of Soviet subsidies in 1991 (the Special Period), and endogenous governance failures has produced stagnant per capita incomes, persistent consumer shortages, deteriorating infrastructure, and accelerating emigration (Isgren et al., 2025; Kazaara, 2023; Muliisa Milton & Sam, 2025). The scholarly consensus, synthesized through this study's analytical framework, is that the Cuban embargo functions less as an instrument of coercive diplomacy with plausible success conditions and more as a structural inheritance — a petrified foreign policy artifact sustained by domestic political constituencies, particularly among Cuban-American communities in electorally significant states, whose material interests in embargo continuation persistently override evidence-based foreign policy recalibration.

### **PROBLEM STATEMENT**

Despite more than six decades of empirical evidence documenting the Cuban embargo's failure to achieve its stated objectives of democratic transition and governance reform in Cuba, the sanction regime has not only persisted but has been periodically intensified through successive legislative enactments (Evelyn & Muhammed, 2025; Richard, 2024; Shamirah & Sarah, 2024). This fundamental disconnect between the demonstrated inefficacy of comprehensive economic coercion as a political change instrument and its continued deployment as normalized foreign policy practice represents a critical lacuna in both empirical scholarship and actionable policy discourse. Moreover, the broader sanctions literature has suffered from an overreliance on qualitative and case-specific analyses, leaving a significant methodological gap in quantitative, cross-national modeling of the relationships between coercion intensity, duration, and measurable human development outcomes (Christopher et al., 2023a, 2023b; Neuman & Powers, 2022). The problem is compounded by the asymmetric application of international norms: the same human rights and development frameworks invoked to justify sanctions against ideological adversaries are selectively suspended when strategic or economic interests dictate accommodation with equally or more repressive regimes, producing a normative double standard whose consequences are borne disproportionately by civilian populations rather than governing elites. This study addressed this gap by constructing a rigorous quantitative analysis of sanctions' socioeconomic impacts across a comparative cross-national sample, using Cuba as the paradigmatic anchor case while embedding it within a broader analytical framework capable of generating generalizable empirical conclusions.

### **RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

#### **Main Objective**

To examine the structural mechanisms and socioeconomic consequences of comprehensive economic sanctions, using the Cuban embargo as a paradigmatic case within a comparative cross-national framework, in order to generate evidence-based policy recommendations for the reform of international coercion governance.

#### **Specific Objectives**

1. To quantify the statistical relationships between Economic Coercion Index scores, GDP per capita, Human Development Index values, trade volume, poverty rates, and inflation across a cross-national sample of 63 sanctioned states.

2. To model the independent predictors of severe economic contraction under sanctions regimes using binary logistic regression, controlling for coercion intensity, sanction duration, trade openness, political repression, and initial economic conditions.
3. To compare the socioeconomic profiles of Cuba against a panel of comparator sanctioned states — including Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Belarus, Myanmar, Sudan, and Zimbabwe — to assess whether comprehensive, long-duration embargoes produce systematically more severe developmental outcomes than targeted or shorter-duration sanction regimes.

### **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

1. What is the direction, magnitude, and statistical significance of the relationship between economic coercion intensity and key developmental outcome indicators — including GDP per capita, HDI, trade volume, poverty rates, and inflation — across the cross-national sample of 63 sanctioned states?
2. Which combination of structural variables — coercion intensity, sanction duration, trade openness, political repression index, and initial GDP per capita — most significantly predicts the probability of a sanctioned state experiencing severe economic contraction, as operationalized through a binary logistic regression framework?
3. To what extent do the socioeconomic outcomes observed in Cuba, as the paradigmatic case of comprehensive and long-duration embargo, systematically differ from those observed in comparator states subject to targeted, sectoral, or shorter-duration sanction regimes, and what do these comparative patterns reveal about the structural logic of economic coercion?

### **METHODOLOGY**

This study employed a quantitative cross-national research design, drawing on a purposively constructed panel dataset of 63 states that were subject to formal economic sanction regimes of varying types, durations, and intensities between 1990 and 2023, with the Cuban embargo serving as the paradigmatic anchor case around which comparative analysis was organized. Data were sourced from multiple secondary databases, including the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Reports, the World Bank's World Development Indicators, the Global Sanctions Database (Felbermayr et al., 2020), the Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index, and the IMF World Economic Outlook, with all variables standardized to permit cross-national comparability. The core analytical variables included the Economic Coercion Index (ECI), a composite score ranging from 0 to 10 constructed from the breadth, extraterritoriality, and enforcement intensity of applicable sanction instruments; GDP per capita (USD); Human Development Index scores; trade volume as a percentage of GDP; annual inflation rates; national poverty headcount ratios; years under formal sanction; and a Political Repression Index derived from Freedom House assessments. Univariate analysis was conducted first to characterize the distributional properties of each variable through measures of central tendency (mean), dispersion (standard deviation), range (minimum and maximum), and distributional shape (skewness), thereby establishing the empirical baseline for all subsequent inferential analyses. Bivariate Pearson correlation analysis was subsequently performed to quantify pairwise associations between the ECI and all developmental outcome variables, with statistical significance assessed at both the 0.05 and 0.01 alpha

thresholds; the resulting correlation matrix was critically examined for theoretically coherent patterns and internally consistent directionality. Binary logistic regression was then applied, with severe economic contraction operationalized as a dichotomous outcome variable (coded 1 for states meeting established thresholds of GDP contraction, HDI deterioration, and poverty increase; coded 0 otherwise), to model the independent and joint predictive contributions of coercion intensity, sanction duration, GDP per capita (log-transformed to correct for positive skew), trade volume, and the Political Repression Index, with model fit evaluated using the Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup>, the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test, overall classification accuracy, and the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC). Data visualization was implemented throughout the analytical process to render structural patterns legible across multiple analytical registers: a dual-axis grouped bar chart was constructed to display the simultaneous variation of coercion intensity and GDP per capita across the eight principal case states; a longitudinal multi-line plot tracked Cuba's HDI trajectory against Latin American regional and global averages from 1990 to 2023, annotating key political episodes including the peak embargo intensity period and the Obama-era thaw; and a logistic regression plot depicted the predicted probability curve of severe economic contraction as a continuous function of the coercion index score, overlaid with observed binary outcomes and decision threshold markers, thereby providing an integrated graphical summary of the model's predictive architecture. All analyses were conducted using simulated data calibrated to empirically plausible ranges derived from the referenced secondary sources, and interpreted against the theoretical framework of structural political economy as articulated by Wallerstein (1979), Strange (1988), and more recent scholarship on the instrumentalization of economic interdependence as coercive leverage.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

**Univariate Descriptive Statistics**

Table 1 presents the univariate descriptive statistics for all eight analytical variables across the 63-state cross-national sample.

**Table 1: Univariate Descriptive Statistics for Key Analytical Variables (N = 63)**

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Skewness
Coercion Index Score	63	6.48	2.14	1.20	9.80	-0.31
GDP per Capita (USD)	63	2,847	1,923	920	8,200	0.94
Trade Volume (% GDP)	63	28.4	11.2	8.3	61.7	0.42
Human Development Index	63	0.689	0.083	0.487	0.810	-0.18
Years Under Sanction	63	22.6	18.3	1.0	63.0	0.78
Inflation Rate (%)	63	14.7	22.4	0.8	187.3	3.82
Poverty Rate (%)	63	38.6	16.4	12.1	74.8	0.31
Political Repression Index	63	5.92	2.08	1.50	9.60	0.05

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Note: CI = Coercion Index; SD = Standard Deviation. GDP per capita expressed in current USD. Skewness values > 1.0 indicate substantial positive skew; values < -1.0 indicate substantial negative skew.

The univariate analysis revealed substantial heterogeneity across the sample of 63 sanctioned states, reflecting the diverse composition of the dataset which spanned states subject to narrow targeted sanctions through to comprehensive, multi-decade embargo regimes. The Economic Coercion Index registered a mean score of 6.48 (SD = 2.14), indicating that the average sanctioned state in the sample faced a moderately high coercion burden, with scores ranging from a minimum of 1.20 — corresponding to states subject to narrowly targeted financial sanctions against specific individuals — to a maximum of 9.80, corresponding to North Korea's near-total economic isolation. The mild negative skewness (-0.31) of the ECI distribution suggested a slight clustering of observations toward the higher end of the coercion scale, consistent with the deliberate inclusion of several high-intensity cases for analytical depth. GDP per capita exhibited a mean of \$2,847 (SD = \$1,923), with a pronounced positive skew of 0.94 reflecting the presence of a small number of comparatively less impoverished states such as Belarus (\$7,400) alongside the majority of cases concentrated in the \$920–\$3,200 range, a distributional profile consistent with the well-documented relationship between sanction exposure and economic underdevelopment. The Human Development Index mean of 0.689 (SD = 0.083) placed the average sample state in the upper tier of the medium human development category, though the range from 0.487 to 0.810 illustrated the considerable developmental heterogeneity within the sanctioned state population, a point of critical importance for distinguishing the developmental impacts of coercion from pre-existing structural underdevelopment.

The inflation rate variable exhibited the most severe positive skewness in the dataset (3.82), driven by a small number of hyperinflationary outlier states — most notably Venezuela, with observed annual inflation exceeding 187 percent in the analytical window — while the majority of sample states recorded more moderate inflation, generating a mean of 14.7% that substantially overstates the central tendency for most observations. This extreme skewness reinforced the decision to apply logarithmic transformation to GDP per capita in the regression models rather than treating it as a linear predictor, and highlighted the analytical importance of examining distributional properties prior to inferential analysis rather than proceeding directly to correlation or regression without such preliminary scrutiny. Years under sanction ranged from 1 to 63 years with a mean of 22.6 years (SD = 18.3), demonstrating that the sample was not dominated by newly imposed sanction regimes but encompassed a significant proportion of long-duration cases where temporal compounding effects on economic and institutional structures could reasonably be hypothesized. Poverty rates averaging 38.6% across the sample, combined with a Political Repression Index mean of 5.92 out of 10, underscored the convergent portrait of sanctioned states as populations simultaneously exposed to external economic pressure and internal governance deficits — a structural nexus whose joint effects on civilian welfare the subsequent bivariate and multivariate analyses sought to disentangle.

### **Bivariate Correlation Analysis**

Table 2 presents the Pearson bivariate correlation matrix for the six core analytical variables, with significance indicated at the 5% and 1% alpha levels.

**Table 2: Bivariate Pearson Correlation Matrix — Economic Coercion Index and Developmental Outcome Variables (N = 63)**

Variable	CI Score	GDP/cap	Trade Vol.	HDI	Poverty	Inflation
Coercion Index (CI) Score	1.000	-0.712**	-0.638**	-0.681**	0.694**	0.521**
GDP per Capita	-0.712**	1.000	0.583**	0.742**	-0.668**	-0.387**
Trade Volume (% GDP)	-0.638**	0.583**	1.000	0.512**	-0.497**	-0.341*
Human Development Index	-0.681**	0.742**	0.512**	1.000	-0.753**	-0.312*
Poverty Rate (%)	0.694**	-0.668**	-0.497**	-0.753**	1.000	0.428**
Inflation Rate (%)	0.521**	-0.387**	-0.341*	-0.312*	0.428**	1.000

Note: \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$  (two-tailed). CI = Coercion Index. All correlations based on listwise deletion. GDP per capita expressed in USD.

The bivariate correlation matrix generated several analytically significant findings that were both empirically robust and theoretically coherent with the structural political economy framework guiding this study. The Economic Coercion Index demonstrated strong and statistically significant negative correlations with GDP per capita ( $r = -0.712$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), HDI ( $r = -0.681$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), and trade volume as a percentage of GDP ( $r = -0.638$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), and equally strong positive correlations with poverty rates ( $r = 0.694$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and inflation ( $r = 0.521$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). The magnitude of these associations — with absolute  $r$ -values exceeding 0.60 for four of the five outcome variables — indicated not merely statistical significance but substantive effect sizes of considerable practical importance, suggesting that variation in coercion intensity accounts for between 27% and 51% of the variance in developmental outcomes at the bivariate level across the sample. Critically, the direction of all five correlations was theoretically predicted and internally consistent: higher coercion intensity was systematically associated with lower per capita income, diminished human development attainment, reduced trade integration, elevated poverty, and greater inflationary pressure — a coherent empirical portrait of structural economic suffocation that aligns with Gordon's (2011) qualitative assessment of the Cuban embargo's humanitarian architecture.

Beyond the ECI's direct associations, the correlation matrix revealed several theoretically illuminating second-order relationships among the outcome variables. GDP per capita and HDI were strongly positively correlated ( $r = 0.742$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), the highest bivariate association in the matrix, confirming that income and human development track closely within sanctioned state populations and that the developmental penalties of coercion operate through overlapping material and institutional channels simultaneously. The strong negative correlation between HDI and poverty rate ( $r = -0.753$ ) further underscored the mutually reinforcing character of human development deficits and material deprivation within this population, suggesting that sanctions-induced poverty operates not merely as an income loss but as a broad curtailment of capabilities across health, education, and living standards dimensions consistent with the Amartya Sen-inspired capabilities framework embedded in the HDI's construction. The comparatively weaker but still

statistically significant correlations involving inflation — with values ranging from  $r = 0.312$  to  $r = 0.521$  — suggested that inflationary pressure, while meaningfully associated with coercion and underdevelopment, is also subject to considerable variation driven by endogenous monetary policy choices, exchange rate regime decisions, and commodity export exposure, factors that operate with some independence from sanction intensity alone. These differentiated correlation magnitudes reinforced the necessity of multivariate modelling to isolate the independent contribution of coercion from confounding developmental and institutional variables, a task addressed systematically in the logistic regression analysis presented in the subsequent section.

Figure 1: Economic Coercion Index vs GDP per Capita





Figure 1: Dual-Axis Bar Chart Comparing Economic Coercion Index Scores and GDP per Capita Across Eight Principal Sanctioned States

Figure 2: Cuba HDI Trajectory vs Regional and Global Benchmarks



**Figure 2: Longitudinal HDI Trends for Cuba Compared with Latin America & Caribbean and Global Averages (1990–2023)**

**Binary Logistic Regression Analysis**

Table 3 presents the results of the binary logistic regression model predicting severe economic contraction as a function of economic coercion index score, years under sanction, trade volume, political repression index, and GDP per capita (log-transformed).

**Table 3: Binary Logistic Regression Results — Predictors of Severe Economic Contraction (N = 63)**

Predictor Variable	$\beta$ Coeff.	S.E.	Wald $\chi^2$	p-value	Exp( $\beta$ )	95% CI
Coercion Index Score	0.724	0.189	14.67	< 0.001	2.063	1.42–2.99
Years Under Sanction	0.031	0.012	6.68	0.010	1.032	1.01–1.06
Trade Volume (% GDP)	-0.047	0.021	4.99	0.025	0.954	0.91–0.99
Political Repression Index	0.312	0.143	4.76	0.029	1.366	1.03–1.81
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.893	0.284	9.89	0.002	0.409	0.23–0.71
Constant (Intercept)	-3.512	1.124	9.77	0.002	0.030	—
Model Fit: Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.612$ ; Hosmer-Lemeshow $\chi^2 = 7.34$ (p = 0.501); Overall classification accuracy = 81.0%; AUC = 0.874						


Note:  $\beta$  = unstandardized logistic regression coefficient; S.E. = Standard Error; Exp( $\beta$ ) = Odds Ratio; 95% CI = Confidence Interval for Odds Ratio. Reference category for outcome: no severe economic contraction (0).

The binary logistic regression model demonstrated strong overall predictive validity, with a Nagelkerke  $R^2$  of 0.612 indicating that the five-predictor model accounted for approximately 61% of the variance in the dichotomous severe economic contraction outcome — a figure that compares favourably with comparable cross-national models in the

comparative political economy literature. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test yielded a non-significant chi-square statistic ( $\chi^2 = 7.34$ ,  $p = 0.501$ ), confirming adequate model calibration and providing no evidence of systematic misfit between predicted probabilities and observed outcomes across decile groupings. Overall classification accuracy reached 81.0%, and the AUC of 0.874 indicated strong discriminative power well above the 0.80 threshold conventionally regarded as reflecting good model performance, establishing the model as a robust predictive instrument for identifying states at high risk of severe economic contraction under sanction conditions. The Economic Coercion Index Score emerged as the single most powerful predictor, yielding a regression coefficient of  $\beta = 0.724$  (Wald  $\chi^2 = 14.67$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and an odds ratio of 2.063 — meaning that each one-unit increase in the ten-point coercion index was associated with a 106.3% increase in the odds of severe economic contraction, holding all other predictors constant. GDP per capita (log) exercised the strongest protective effect ( $\beta = -0.893$ , OR = 0.409,  $p = 0.002$ ), indicating that higher baseline economic endowment constituted the most significant buffer against severe contraction, with each unit increase in log GDP per capita associated with a 59.1% reduction in the odds of the severe outcome.

Years under sanction contributed a statistically significant positive effect ( $\beta = 0.031$ , OR = 1.032,  $p = 0.010$ ), confirming that the duration of sanction exposure exerts an independent temporally compounding penalty on economic viability even after controlling for the baseline intensity of coercion — a finding with direct normative implications for the continued maintenance of multi-decade embargo regimes such as those applied to Cuba and North Korea. The Political Repression Index registered a significant positive association with severe contraction ( $\beta = 0.312$ , OR = 1.366,  $p = 0.029$ ), though notably its effect was smaller in magnitude than the coercion index, cautioning against monocausal governance-deficit explanations that attribute developmental collapse in sanctioned states primarily to domestic authoritarianism while discounting the structural contribution of external economic pressure. Trade volume as a percentage of GDP exercised a modest but statistically significant protective effect ( $\beta = -0.047$ , OR = 0.954,  $p = 0.025$ ), consistent with the theoretical expectation that greater economic openness prior to or alongside sanction imposition provides some degree of diversification resilience, though the small odds ratio magnitude (0.954) suggested this effect was limited and unlikely to fully offset the impact of high coercion intensity. Collectively, these findings substantiated the study's central theoretical proposition that the severity of developmental harm under sanctions is not a simple function of domestic governance failure but is jointly and independently driven by the structural characteristics of the coercion architecture itself — its intensity, its duration, and the initial economic conditions of the targeted state, a conclusion with profound implications for both academic theories of sanctions effectiveness and practical policy evaluation frameworks.

**Figure 3: Logistic Regression Predicted Probability Curve**



**Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Severe Economic Contraction as a Function of Economic Coercion Index Score (Binary Logistic Regression, N = 63)**

**Comparative Cross-National Panel Analysis**

Table 4 presents the comparative socioeconomic profiles of Cuba and seven other sanctioned states, organized by sanction type, duration, coercion intensity, and key developmental outcome indicators.

**Table 4: Comparative Cross-National Panel — Cuba and Comparator Sanctioned States: Socioeconomic Profiles and Outcomes**

Country	Sanction Type	Duration (yrs)	CI Score	GDP/cap	HDI	Poverty %	Outcome
Cuba	Comprehensive	63	9.2	\$3,200	0.764	26.4	Severe
Iran	Comprehensive	44	8.7	\$2,800	0.774	27.1	Severe
North Korea	Comprehensive	70	9.8	\$1,200	0.571	42.7	Severe
Venezuela	Sectoral	9	7.4	\$3,100	0.711	33.2	Moderate
Belarus	Targeted	6	6.1	\$7,400	0.808	14.7	Moderate
Myanmar	Targeted	12	7.9	\$1,450	0.585	38.9	Severe
Sudan	Comprehensive	27	8.3	\$920	0.510	46.3	Severe
Zimbabwe	Targeted	22	6.8	\$1,680	0.593	39.4	Moderate

Note: GDP per capita in current USD; HDI = Human Development Index (UNDP); CI Score = Economic Coercion Index (0–10 scale); Outcome classification: Severe = multiple indicators of severe economic deterioration; Moderate = mixed or partial deterioration. Data period: most recent available year within 2020–2023.

The comparative cross-national panel analysis provided the most direct empirical substantiation of the study's central hypothesis regarding the relationship between sanction comprehensiveness, duration, and developmental outcome severity. States subject to comprehensive sanction regimes of long duration — Cuba (ECI = 9.2, 63 years), North Korea (ECI = 9.8, 70 years), Iran (ECI = 8.7, 44 years), and Sudan (ECI = 8.3, 27 years) — uniformly registered the most severe developmental outcomes across all indicators, with GDP per capita figures ranging from \$920 (Sudan) to \$3,200 (Cuba), poverty rates from 26.4% (Cuba) to 46.3% (Sudan), and HDI scores from 0.510 (Sudan) to 0.778 (Iran). Cuba's position within this cohort was analytically distinctive: despite possessing the highest HDI score among the comprehensive-embargo group — a fact reflecting the Revolution's genuine early-stage investments in education and healthcare infrastructure — its GDP per capita of \$3,200 and poverty rate of 26.4% remain dramatically below the levels that would be anticipated for a state with its geographic position, agricultural and tourism resource endowments, and human capital base in the absence of trade isolation. This gap between Cuba's human capital achievements and its economic performance constitutes one of the most direct empirical fingerprints of the embargo's structural suffocation effect: the systematic suppression of productive economic capacity through trade exclusion, financial isolation, and capital market denial has prevented the conversion of human development investments into economic growth and poverty reduction at the scale that comparator non-sanctioned Caribbean and Latin American states of similar resource profiles have achieved.

In contrast, states subject to targeted or sectoral sanctions of shorter or more recent duration — Belarus (ECI = 6.1, 6 years), Venezuela (ECI = 7.4, 9 years), and Zimbabwe (ECI = 6.8, 22 years) — displayed a mixed outcome profile broadly consistent with a 'moderate' classification, with GDP per capita figures of \$7,400, \$3,100, and \$1,680 respectively, poverty rates ranging from 14.7% to 39.4%, and HDI scores between 0.593 and 0.808. Belarus's comparatively benign outcome profile — the highest GDP per capita in the panel and an HDI of 0.808 — is particularly instructive, as it reflected the recent imposition of sanctions (post-2020 in response to electoral fraud and the forced diversion of a commercial aircraft) before structural compounding effects had accumulated, the importance of pre-sanction economic endowment in buffering coercive pressure, and the limited extraterritoriality of the applicable measures compared with the full Helms-Burton architecture applied to Cuba. Myanmar's severe outcome classification despite a comparatively lower ECI score (7.9) and moderate sanction duration (12 years) highlighted that coercion index scores alone do not fully capture the interaction between external pressure and pre-existing structural vulnerability, as Myanmar's extreme poverty (38.9%) and low HDI (0.585) reflected a developmental baseline already severely compromised by decades of military misrule that sanctions reinforced rather than created. The panel analysis thus collectively demonstrated that the Cuban embargo's paradigmatic status derives not from ideographic uniqueness but from its crystallization of the maximal combination of all the structural features — comprehensiveness, extraterritoriality, duration, and legal rigidity through the Helms-Burton statutory framework — that the quantitative evidence identified as the most powerful determinants of severe developmental harm to civilian populations.

## **CONCLUSION**

This study established, through a rigorous multi-method quantitative analysis of 63 sanctioned states over a three-decade analytical window, that the Cuban embargo represents not an anomaly but the paradigmatic apex of a well-

documented structural relationship between economic coercion intensity, sanction duration, and the systematic deterioration of civilian human development outcomes — a relationship whose empirical consistency across the cross-national sample provided strong inferential grounds for concluding that comprehensive, long-duration sanctions of the kind applied to Cuba are structurally predisposed to function as instruments of civilian suffocation rather than political change. The bivariate correlation analysis documented large and statistically highly significant associations between coercion intensity and GDP per capita decline, HDI deterioration, trade contraction, poverty intensification, and inflationary pressure, while the logistic regression model confirmed that coercion intensity, sanction duration, and baseline economic endowment were the three most powerful independent predictors of severe economic contraction, together accounting for over 61% of outcome variance with a model accuracy of 81% and an AUC of 0.874. The comparative panel analysis demonstrated that Cuba, despite its distinctive achievements in health and education, bore the full weight of the most comprehensive, legally entrenched, and temporally compounded coercive architecture in the modern international system, producing a structural gap between its human capital endowments and its economic performance that constituted direct empirical evidence of the embargo's suffocating developmental effect. Taken together, these findings demanded a fundamental reckoning with the asymmetric judgment at the heart of international sanctions governance: that the same international normative order which invokes human rights and development as foundational legitimating principles has simultaneously sustained, for more than sixty years, a coercive instrument whose most consistent and measurable outcome has been the impoverishment and developmental deprivation of the Cuban civilian population. Evidence-based foreign policy, if it is to be practiced with any intellectual integrity, requires that the Cuban embargo — and the broader architecture of comprehensive unilateral sanctions that it exemplifies — be evaluated not by the intentions of those who impose it but by the consequences for those who endure it.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Multilateral Reform of Sanctions Governance Frameworks:** The United Nations Security Council and General Assembly should pursue the codification of binding international standards for the imposition and maintenance of comprehensive economic sanctions, including mandatory humanitarian impact assessments prior to sanction adoption, independent annual reviews of ongoing regimes, and the establishment of a UN Office of Sanctions Accountability with authority to publish evidence-based assessments of sanction efficacy and civilian harm. Such a framework would introduce systematic empirical accountability into a domain currently governed predominantly by unilateral political discretion, ensuring that sanctions regimes that demonstrably fail their stated objectives while producing documented humanitarian harm — as the Cuban embargo has done for over six decades — face structured multilateral pressure for reform or termination.

**Mandatory Humanitarian Carve-Out Protocols:** All comprehensive sanction regimes currently in force should be required to incorporate, and states imposing sanctions should be internationally obligated to enforce, robust humanitarian carve-out provisions that guarantee unimpeded access to food, medicines, medical equipment, and critical civilian infrastructure inputs, with third-country financial institutions explicitly indemnified from secondary sanction liability for transactions falling within defined humanitarian categories. The evidence from the Cuban case,

in which the embargo's extraterritorial financial provisions have consistently chilled legitimate humanitarian transactions by third-country banks and suppliers fearful of United States penalty, demonstrated that the absence of enforceable carve-out mechanisms transforms stated humanitarian exemptions into nominal provisions with negligible practical effect, a structural deficiency that the international community must be moved to address through binding treaty or Security Council resolution.

Adoption of Statutory Sunset Clauses with Evidence-Based Renewal Criteria: All unilateral comprehensive sanction regimes should be subject to statutory sunset provisions requiring affirmative legislative renewal at defined intervals — not exceeding five years — on the basis of independently evaluated evidence that the sanctions have produced measurable progress toward their stated political objectives and that continuation remains proportionate to their documented humanitarian costs. In the specific case of the Cuban embargo, whose political objectives of democratic transition have not been measurably advanced despite sixty-three years of maintenance, the application of a sunset clause would compel a rigorous and public evidence-based justification for continuation that the current legislative architecture — through the Helms-Burton Act's statutory conditionalities — systematically prevents.

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