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The impact of Constituency Development Funds on parliamentary accountability and independence

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Abstract

This study examined the impact of Constituency Development Funds (CDF) on parliamentary accountability and legislative independence in Uganda, drawing on a sample of 312 respondents comprising Members of Parliament, parliamentary staff, civil society representatives, and community leaders. Employing a quantitative cross-sectional survey design, the study collected primary data using a structured, pre-tested Likert-scale questionnaire. Statistical analyses encompassed univariate descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation analysis, multiple linear regression, and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) using maximum likelihood estimation. Results revealed that CDF transparency ($\beta = .42$, $p < .001$) and CDF oversight mechanisms ($\beta = .35$, $p < .001$) were significant positive predictors of parliamentary accountability, while CDF political interference exhibited a significant negative effect ($\beta = -.28$, $p = .001$). The regression model explained 52.1% of the variance in parliamentary accountability ($R^2 = .521$, $F(3, 308) = 111.7$, $p < .001$). SEM path analysis confirmed the structural relationships, with model fit indices indicating excellent model-data correspondence (CFI = 0.963, RMSEA = 0.048, $\chi^2/df = 1.87$). Parliamentary accountability significantly predicted both legislative independence ($\beta = 0.51$, $p < .001$) and constituency representation ($\beta = 0.44$, $p < .001$). The study concluded that CDF management quality—particularly transparency and oversight—is a critical determinant of parliamentary accountability in Uganda. Recommendations included strengthening CDF audit frameworks, depoliticizing fund allocation, and enacting independent parliamentary oversight legislation.

Keywords: Constituency Development Funds, parliamentary accountability, legislative independence, Uganda, SEM, governance

INTRODUCTION

Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) represent a globally prevalent fiscal mechanism through which central governments allocate discretionary budgetary resources directly to elected legislators for investment in local-level development projects (Government of Uganda, 1995; Huda et al., 2021; Lailam & Lutfi Chakim, 2023). Originating in the Philippines in the 1990s and subsequently diffusing across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, CDFs have been established in over 60 countries, with notable adoptions in Kenya, Uganda, India, Zambia, and Papua New Guinea, among others. In sub-Saharan Africa, CDFs have been particularly embraced as instruments for bridging the chronic infrastructure and service delivery gap that pervades rural and peri-urban constituencies (Murphy, 2022; Muwada & Muhammed, 2025). In Uganda, the government institutionalized CDF-equivalent mechanisms through parliamentary allocations that empower Members of Parliament (MPs) to oversee direct expenditures on education, health, roads, and water provision within their constituencies (EFUNTADE et al., 2023; Julius & Gracious Kazaara, 2025; Khan & Sheikh, 2023). While proponents argue that CDFs enhance responsiveness and bring democratic accountability closer to the electorate, critics have raised sustained concerns about the dual-mandate paradox—that legislators entrusted with oversight and legislative functions simultaneously assume executive roles as fund administrators, thereby

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generating inherent conflicts of interest that may fundamentally compromise parliamentary independence (Audrey & Nancy, 2026; Dorrell & Jansa, 2022; A. Sharon et al., 2023). The tension between the developmental imperatives of CDFs and the constitutional norms of legislative independence has attracted increasing scholarly scrutiny, yet robust empirical evidence, particularly from the Ugandan context, remains sparse (Fentahun, 2023; Ninsiima et al., 2023). This study therefore situated itself at the intersection of public finance, legislative governance, and democratic accountability to empirically assess the extent to which CDF management dimensions—specifically transparency, oversight mechanisms, and political interference—shape parliamentary accountability and legislative independence among Uganda's legislators. By generating evidence-based insights, the study sought to inform policy reforms that can reconcile developmental mandates with the constitutional imperatives of parliamentary autonomy.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Uganda's Parliament operates within a Westminster-inherited constitutional framework that assigns the legislature a tripartite mandate: law-making, representation, and executive oversight. These functions are premised on the structural independence of the legislature from the executive branch, a principle enshrined in Articles 77–108 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda (Muwada & Muhammed, 2025). However, the proliferation of constituency-level development funds managed directly by Members of Parliament has progressively blurred the boundary between legislative oversight and executive implementation in ways that scholars of African legislative politics have found deeply troubling. The Ugandan government has allocated constituency funds—channelled through the Uganda Road Fund, the Presidential Zonal tours, and various sectoral grants—that are not only controlled by MPs but are also politically leveraged during electoral cycles (Gloria et al., 2023; Pujiati et al., 2020; Siagian & Roni, 2025). Evidence from Commonwealth Parliamentary Association reports and Uganda's own Auditor General annual reports has consistently documented systemic weaknesses in CDF accountability, including procurement irregularities, misappropriation, weak parliamentary scrutiny of fund use, and the subordination of parliamentary oversight agendas to local political calculations tied to fund access (Muhwezi et al., 2020; Nurudeen et al., 2024; Osman, 2019; Sweeny, 2013; Werbner & Werbner, 2020). Comparative literature from Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia further illuminates how CDFs reshape legislative behaviour by incentivising MPs to prioritise constituency service delivery over their oversight mandates, thereby weakening their propensity to hold the executive accountable on matters of national fiscal discipline and policy implementation (Julius & Sula, n.d.; Julius & Twinomujuni, 2025; N. Sharon & Julius, 2024). The situation is compounded in Uganda by persistent concerns about executive dominance of Parliament, wherein ruling-party legislators face disincentives to challenge executive authority for fear of losing access to discretionary development resources (Julius & Godfrey, 2025; Julius & Mategeko, 2025; Obasaju et al., 2021; Prundeanu-Thrower, 2022). Against this backdrop, there was a compelling theoretical and empirical need to rigorously examine the mechanisms through which CDF design, management, and political contestation translate into measurable variations in parliamentary accountability and independence, which constituted the central problematic motivating this study.

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PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite the widespread adoption of Constituency Development Funds across sub-Saharan Africa, the relationship between CDF management and parliamentary accountability remains empirically underdeveloped in Uganda. Existing studies have largely focused on the developmental outcomes of CDFs, leaving the governance and institutional accountability dimensions underexplored (Derick & Benard, 2025; Kazaara & Nancy, 2025; Kim et al., 2018; Priscilla et al., 2023). Specifically, it is unclear to what extent CDF transparency, oversight mechanisms, and political interference independently and collectively influence parliamentary accountability and legislative independence among Uganda's legislators. The absence of rigorous quantitative evidence on these relationships impedes evidence-based legislative reforms and perpetuates governance arrangements that may simultaneously undermine fiscal accountability and democratic oversight (Fahadi & William, 2023; Ramada & Utari, 2024; Robertson et al., 2018). This study therefore sought to address this gap by empirically investigating the impact of CDF management dimensions on parliamentary accountability and independence in Uganda, using a structural equation modelling framework capable of capturing both direct and mediated relationships among these constructs.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS

Main Objective

To examine the impact of Constituency Development Fund management dimensions on parliamentary accountability and legislative independence in Uganda.

Specific Objectives

1. To assess the influence of CDF transparency on parliamentary accountability among Members of Parliament in Uganda.
2. To examine the effect of CDF oversight mechanisms and political interference on parliamentary accountability in Uganda.
3. To determine the extent to which parliamentary accountability mediates the relationship between CDF management dimensions and legislative independence in Uganda.

Research Questions

1. To what extent does CDF transparency influence parliamentary accountability among Members of Parliament in Uganda?
2. How do CDF oversight mechanisms and political interference affect parliamentary accountability in Uganda?
3. To what extent does parliamentary accountability mediate the relationship between CDF management and legislative independence in Uganda?

METHODOLOGY

This study adopted a quantitative cross-sectional survey research design grounded in the positivist paradigm, which was considered appropriate for generating objective, generalizable evidence on the relationship between CDF

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management dimensions and parliamentary accountability in Uganda. The target population comprised Members of Parliament, parliamentary staff, civil society organizations engaged in legislative oversight, constituency-level administrative officers, and community leaders drawn from Uganda's ten administrative regions. A multi-stage stratified random sampling procedure was employed to ensure proportional representation across regions and respondent categories, yielding a final valid sample of 312 respondents after data cleaning. Primary data were collected using a structured, self-administered questionnaire that was operationalized on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with constructs measuring CDF Transparency (CT), CDF Oversight Mechanisms (COM), CDF Political Interference (CPI), Parliamentary Accountability (PA), Legislative Independence (LI), Constituency Representation (CR), and Executive Oversight Capacity (EOC). The instrument underwent rigorous pre-testing with a pilot sample of 30 respondents, and internal consistency reliability was confirmed for all scales (Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranging from $\alpha = .78$ to $\alpha = .89$). Data analysis proceeded in three sequential stages: at the univariate level, descriptive statistics including means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis were computed to characterize the distributional properties of all study variables and assess conformity with normality assumptions required for subsequent parametric analyses; at the bivariate level, Pearson product-moment correlation analysis was conducted to examine the magnitude, direction, and statistical significance of pairwise associations among the study constructs, thereby establishing the preliminary empirical basis for predictor selection in regression modelling; and at the multivariate level, multiple linear regression analysis was performed using the enter method to estimate the net individual contributions of CDF transparency, oversight mechanisms, and political interference to the prediction of parliamentary accountability after controlling for multicollinearity, assessed via Variance Inflation Factors (VIF < 2.1 for all predictors), heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test, $p > .05$), and autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 1.97). Finally, Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) using maximum likelihood estimation was implemented in AMOS 26.0 to test the full hypothesized structural model, including the mediating role of parliamentary accountability in the CDF–legislative independence pathway; model fit was evaluated against established benchmarks including CFI ≥ .95, RMSEA ≤ .06, SRMR ≤ .08, and $\chi^2/df \leq 3.00$, all of which were satisfactorily attained. All statistical analyses were conducted at $\alpha = .05$ level of significance (Nelson et al., 2022, 2023).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Univariate Analysis: Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables (n = 312)

Variable	N	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis
CDF Utilization (CU)	312	1.00	5.00	2.81	0.72	-0.18	2.91
CDF Transparency (CT)	312	1.00	5.00	2.65	0.81	-0.22	2.87
CDF Oversight Mechanisms (COM)	312	1.00	5.00	2.74	0.77	-0.11	2.93
CDF Political Interference (CPI)	312	1.00	5.00	3.18	0.88	0.31	2.76

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Parliamentary Accountability (PA)	312	1.00	5.00	2.59	0.83	-0.29	3.01
Legislative Independence (LI)	312	1.00	5.00	2.47	0.91	-0.41	3.14
Constituency Representation (CR)	312	1.00	5.00	2.68	0.79	-0.19	2.89
Executive Oversight Capacity (EOC)	312	1.00	5.00	2.53	0.85	-0.33	2.98

Table 1 presented the descriptive characteristics of all eight study variables, revealing patterns that were substantively informative for interpreting the subsequent inferential analyses. Parliamentary Accountability (PA) recorded the lowest mean score (M = 2.59, SD = 0.83), closely followed by Legislative Independence (LI) at M = 2.47, SD = 0.91—both falling below the theoretical midpoint of 3.00 on the five-point Likert scale. These values collectively indicated that respondents generally perceived accountability and independence dimensions of parliamentary functioning to be inadequate in the context of CDF management in Uganda. In stark contrast, CDF Political Interference registered the highest mean score (M = 3.18, SD = 0.88), signalling that political interference in CDF processes was perceived to be more prevalent than transparent and oversight-driven management practices. The standard deviation values for all variables ranged between 0.72 and 0.91, indicating moderate variability across respondents—suggesting that perceptions were not uniformly distributed and that subgroup differences may have existed across regions, parliamentary experience, and respondent categories.

From a distributional standpoint, the skewness coefficients for all variables fell within the acceptable range of ±1.0, and kurtosis values approximated the normal distribution benchmark of 3.00, thereby satisfying the normality assumptions underlying Pearson correlation and multiple regression analyses. Of particular note was the positive skew exhibited by CDF Political Interference (skewness = 0.31), reflecting a distribution where a substantial proportion of respondents attributed higher-than-average levels of political interference to CDF management processes. These findings resonated with existing literature from comparable African legislative contexts—notably Odhiambo and Taifa's (2019) assessment of Kenya's National Government Constituencies Development Fund—which similarly documented that interference by executive actors and ruling-party structures constitutes a persistent structural threat to the integrity of constituency-level fund management. The relatively low mean scores for transparency and oversight mechanisms further corroborated audit findings from Uganda's Auditor General reports, which have repeatedly flagged deficiencies in CDF accountability frameworks at the parliamentary level.

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

Figure 1 illustrates regional disparities in CDF utilization scores, with the Central Region recording the highest mean (3.12) and the Northern Region the lowest (2.48), potentially reflecting historical marginalization and weaker institutional infrastructure in post-conflict areas.

Bivariate Analysis: Pearson Correlation Matrix

Table 2: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Study Variables (n = 312)

Variable	CT	COM	CPI	PA	LI	CR	EOC
CDF Transparency (CT)	1.00						
CDF Oversight Mechanisms (COM)	.52**	1.00					
CDF Political Interference (CPI)	-.38**	-.44**	1.00				
Parliamentary Accountability (PA)	.61**	.57**	-.46**	1.00			
Legislative Independence (LI)	.55**	.49**	-.39**	.63**	1.00		
Constituency Representation (CR)	.44**	.41**	-.32**	.58**	.54**	1.00	
Exec. Oversight Capacity (EOC)	.48**	.46**	-.35**	.59**	.61**	.53**	1.00

Note: ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed). Diagonal = 1.00.

The Pearson correlation matrix in Table 2 revealed a consistent pattern of statistically significant associations among the study constructs at the $p < .01$ level. Parliamentary Accountability (PA) exhibited strong positive correlations with CDF Transparency ($r = .61$), CDF Oversight Mechanisms ($r = .57$), Legislative Independence ($r = .63$), Constituency Representation ($r = .58$), and Executive Oversight Capacity ($r = .59$). Conversely, PA demonstrated a moderate-to-

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strong negative correlation with CDF Political Interference (r = -.46), indicating that higher perceived political interference was systematically associated with lower levels of parliamentary accountability. These bivariate findings provided initial empirical support for the three hypothesized directional relationships underpinning the study's structural model. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicated practically significant associations beyond mere statistical significance—with effect sizes (r^2 values) ranging from 10.2% shared variance (CPI × CR) to 39.7% shared variance (PA × LI)—suggesting that the hypothesized mechanisms linking CDF management to legislative outcomes were substantively meaningful and warranted further multivariate examination.

The inter-predictor correlations among the three CDF management dimensions (CT, COM, CPI) were moderate and in the anticipated directions, with transparency and oversight mechanisms positively correlated (r = .52) and both negatively correlated with political interference (r = -.38 and -.44 respectively). These correlation magnitudes were sufficiently below the threshold of r > .80 commonly associated with multicollinearity concerns, and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) diagnostics confirmed that multicollinearity did not unduly compromise the regression estimates (VIF range: 1.31–1.74). Notably, the correlation between Legislative Independence and Executive Oversight Capacity (r = .61) suggested that these two outcome dimensions co-varied substantially, a finding that underscored the theoretical coherence of the study's conceptualization of parliamentary capacity as a multidimensional construct shaped by both the internal legislative dynamics and the external CDF management environment. These findings contributed meaningfully to the literature by providing the first systematic correlation-based mapping of CDF governance dimensions and parliamentary outcomes in the Ugandan context.

Figure 2: Scatter Plot of CDF Utilization vs. Parliamentary Accountability (n = 312)



Figure 2 displays the scatter plot and regression line confirming the positive linear relationship between CDF Utilization and Parliamentary Accountability (r = .61, p < .001), with the regression line slope indicating that each unit increase in CDF utilization quality corresponded to a 0.58-unit gain in accountability scores.

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Multiple Regression Analysis

Table 3: Multiple Linear Regression — Predictors of Parliamentary Accountability

Predictor	**B**	**SE**	**β**	**t**	**p**	**95% CI (Lower)**	**95% CI (Upper)**
(Constant)	0.48	0.19	—	2.53	.012	0.11	0.85
CDF Transparency (CT)	0.39	0.07	.42	5.57	<.001	0.25	0.53
CDF Oversight Mechanisms (COM)	0.31	0.08	.35	3.88	<.001	0.15	0.47
CDF Political Interference (CPI)	-0.22	0.06	-.28	-3.67	.001	-0.34	-0.10
$R^2 = .521$ Adj. $R^2 = .517$ $F(3,308) = 111.7$ $p < .001$ Durbin-Watson = 1.97							

Note: Dependent variable = Parliamentary Accountability. VIF range: 1.31–1.74. Tolerance range: 0.57–0.76.

The multiple linear regression model, reported in Table 3, was statistically significant ($F(3, 308) = 111.7$, $p < .001$) and explained 52.1% of the variance in Parliamentary Accountability ($R^2 = .521$, Adjusted $R^2 = .517$), indicating a strong predictive model. All three CDF management dimensions emerged as significant independent predictors of parliamentary accountability after controlling for the shared variance among predictors. CDF Transparency was the strongest positive predictor ($\beta = .42$, $t = 5.57$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.25, 0.53]), followed by CDF Oversight Mechanisms ($\beta = .35$, $t = 3.88$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.15, 0.47]). In contrast, CDF Political Interference was a significant negative predictor ($\beta = -.28$, $t = -3.67$, $p = .001$, 95% CI [-0.34, -0.10]), confirming that as political interference in CDF processes intensified, parliamentary accountability correspondingly diminished. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.97 indicated the absence of significant autocorrelation in the residuals, and the non-significant Breusch-Pagan test confirmed homoscedasticity, thereby validating the robustness of the regression estimates.

These regression findings carried substantial theoretical and policy significance. The positive effect of CDF transparency on accountability ($\beta = .42$) was consistent with principal-agent theory, which predicts that when agents (MPs) are required to disclose the management of funds entrusted to them by principals (constituents), the incentive structures that govern legislative behaviour are reoriented toward accountable conduct. The comparable effect of oversight mechanisms ($\beta = .35$) corroborated institutional accountability frameworks, suggesting that formal structures including audit committees, parliamentary oversight hearings, and community-level monitoring bodies constitute critical governance infrastructure for maintaining accountability norms in CDF administration. Most strikingly, the negative effect of political interference ($\beta = -.28$) aligned with the captured legislature hypothesis articulated by Barkan (2009), wherein executive-controlled patronage disbursements systematically erode the independence and accountability-seeking behaviour of legislators who are dependent on politically controlled funds.

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Taken together, these findings advanced a clear policy implication: improvements in CDF transparency and oversight yield measurable dividends in parliamentary accountability, while reductions in political interference are equally essential preconditions for restoring the integrity of legislative oversight functions in Uganda.

Structural Equation Model Analysis

Table 4: SEM Fit Indices and Standardized Path Coefficients

Path / Index	**Estimate**	**SE**	**CR / Value**	**p**	**Decision**
── Model Fit Indices ──					
Chi-Square (χ^2)	87.43				—
Degrees of Freedom	47				—
χ^2/df	1.87			< 3.00	Acceptable
CFI	0.963			≥ 0.95	Acceptable
TLI	0.951			≥ 0.95	Acceptable
RMSEA	0.048			< 0.06	Acceptable
SRMR	0.052			< 0.08	Acceptable
── Structural Paths ──					
CT → Parliamentary Accountability	0.42	0.08	5.25	<.001	Supported
COM → Parliamentary Accountability	0.35	0.09	3.89	<.001	Supported
CPI → Parliamentary Accountability	-0.28	0.07	-4.00	.001	Supported
PA → Legislative Independence	0.51	0.09	5.67	<.001	Supported
PA → Constituency Representation	0.44	0.08	5.50	<.001	Supported

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$. CR = Critical Ratio.

The Structural Equation Model presented in Table 4 demonstrated excellent model-data fit across all evaluated indices: CFI = 0.963 (≥ .95), TLI = 0.951 (≥ .95), RMSEA = 0.048 (≤ .06), SRMR = 0.052 (≤ .08), and χ^2/df = 1.87 (≤ 3.00), collectively confirming that the hypothesized structural model provided an adequate and parsimonious representation of the covariance structure in the observed data. All five hypothesized structural paths were statistically significant at $p < .001$. CDF Transparency exerted the strongest direct effect on Parliamentary Accountability ($\beta = 0.42$, CR = 5.25), followed by CDF Oversight Mechanisms ($\beta = 0.35$, CR = 3.89) and CDF Political Interference ($\beta = -0.28$, CR = -4.00). The path from Parliamentary Accountability to Legislative Independence was the strongest in the model ($\beta = 0.51$, CR = 5.67), while the path to Constituency Representation was also substantial ($\beta = 0.44$, CR = 5.50), confirming parliamentary accountability as a central mediating construct linking CDF management to downstream legislative outcomes.

The SEM findings extended the regression results by simultaneously estimating all structural relationships within a single integrated model, thereby accounting for measurement error and providing a more rigorous test of the

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hypothesized causal structure. The mediation of parliamentary accountability in the CDF–legislative independence pathway was particularly noteworthy: it implied that improvements in CDF transparency did not directly translate into greater legislative independence but operated through the intermediate mechanism of enhanced accountability norms and practices within Parliament. This finding had important theoretical implications for the literature on democratic governance in Africa, suggesting that legislative independence is not simply a function of formal constitutional arrangements but is dynamically shaped by the quality of public resource management practices that condition the behavioural autonomy of individual legislators. From a practical standpoint, the SEM results underscored that accountability-strengthening interventions targeting CDF management systems were likely to generate spillover benefits for legislative independence—a finding with actionable implications for parliamentary reform agendas in Uganda and comparable CDF-adopting countries across sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 3: Structural Equation Model – CDF and Parliamentary Accountability (CFI=0.96, RMSEA=0.048, SRMR=0.052, χ^2/df=1.87)



Figure 3 presents the final SEM path diagram with standardized coefficients, illustrating the direct effects of CDF management dimensions on parliamentary accountability and the subsequent downstream effects on legislative independence and constituency representation. All path coefficients are significant at $p \leq .001$.

CONCLUSION

This study provided robust empirical evidence that the management quality of Constituency Development Funds is a significant determinant of parliamentary accountability and legislative independence in Uganda. Across univariate, bivariate, regression, and structural equation modelling analyses, CDF transparency and oversight mechanisms consistently emerged as positive drivers of parliamentary accountability, while political interference in CDF processes exerted a systematically negative effect. The SEM results further confirmed that parliamentary accountability served as a critical mediating mechanism through which CDF management quality influenced legislative independence and constituency representation, explaining over half of the variance in accountability outcomes and demonstrating

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excellent structural model fit. These findings collectively challenged the prevailing developmental framing of CDFs—which tends to emphasize service delivery outcomes—by demonstrating that CDF design and governance have profound institutional consequences for the legislative branch of government. In the Ugandan context, where executive dominance of Parliament has been a persistent concern, the evidence suggested that the current CDF framework as administered may be inadvertently reinforcing rather than ameliorating accountability deficits by creating conditions for political interference that suppress the independence of legislators. Addressing these structural governance weaknesses through legislative and institutional reforms constitutes an urgent priority for Uganda's Parliament, the executive, and civil society actors committed to strengthening democratic accountability and legislative governance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Strengthen CDF Audit and Transparency Frameworks. The government of Uganda should enact mandatory, publicly accessible CDF audit reports at both constituency and national levels, with enforcement mechanisms tied to subsequent fund disbursements. Parliament should establish a dedicated CDF Accountability Committee equipped with forensic audit capacity, independent of ruling-party influence, to conduct systematic ex-post reviews of fund utilization. These measures would directly address the transparency deficit identified in this study ($\beta = .42$) and create institutional incentives for accountable fund management.

Depoliticize CDF Allocation and Administration. Clear statutory provisions should be enacted to insulate CDF allocation, procurement, and disbursement processes from partisan political manipulation. A rules-based, formula-driven allocation system—administered by an independent statutory body analogous to Kenya's National Government Constituencies Development Fund Board—would substantially reduce the executive leverage over individual legislators that the study identified as a significant suppressor of parliamentary accountability ($\beta = -.28$). Separation of the MP's legislative oversight role from CDF administrative responsibilities should be constitutionally clarified to eliminate the structural conflict of interest.

Institutionalize Parliamentary Oversight of CDF Performance. Uganda's Parliament should adopt a CDF Performance Oversight Act that mandates quarterly performance reviews, community participation in project selection and monitoring, and mandatory disclosure of all CDF expenditure to the relevant parliamentary committee. The SEM findings demonstrated that parliamentary accountability mediates the relationship between CDF management quality and legislative independence ($\beta = 0.51$), implying that investments in parliamentary oversight infrastructure will generate compounding institutional dividends—strengthening not only CDF accountability but the broader legislative independence and constituency representation capacity of Uganda's Parliament.

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