

The Effectiveness Of The Public Procurement And Disposal Of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) In Promoting Transparency In Procurement Processes At Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA)

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Abstract

This study examined the effectiveness of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) in promoting transparency in procurement processes at Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). Public procurement in Uganda consumes a substantial share of the national budget, and the transparency of procurement is central to value for money and public trust. The study was guided by three objectives: to assess the extent to which PPDA regulatory mechanisms enhance procurement transparency at KCCA; to examine the role of compliance and audit functions in curbing procurement malpractice; and to establish the relationship between PPDA oversight and transparency outcomes. A cross-sectional descriptive and correlational design was adopted, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. Data were collected from a sample of 132 respondents drawn from procurement officers, user departments, contracts committee members, and providers using structured questionnaires and key-informant interviews. Descriptive statistics, Pearson correlations, and multiple regression were used to analyse the data. Findings revealed a positive and significant relationship between PPDA oversight and procurement transparency ($r = 0.68$, $p < 0.01$), with regulatory mechanisms ($\beta = 0.41$) and compliance/audit functions ($\beta = 0.33$) jointly explaining 54% of the variation in transparency outcomes. The study concluded that PPDA has been moderately effective, with capacity, enforcement delays, and political interference constraining full effectiveness. It recommended strengthening real-time monitoring, e-procurement adoption, and sanctions enforcement.

Keywords: Public procurement, PPDA, transparency, compliance, accountability, KCCA, Uganda.

1. Introduction and Background

Public procurement is one of the most critical functions of government because it transforms public financial resources into the goods, works, and services required to deliver essential public services and implement national development programmes (Muhamad et al., 2023). Governments around the world rely on public procurement to acquire infrastructure, medical supplies, educational materials, information technology systems, and professional services necessary for economic growth and social welfare (Kazaara & Kazaara, 2025). Due to its strategic importance, procurement has become a key instrument for achieving policy objectives such as sustainable development, economic inclusion, innovation, and efficient public financial management (Julius & Kazaara, 2026d). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that public procurement represents approximately 13–20% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) globally and accounts for nearly one-third of government expenditure in many countries, making it one of the largest areas of public spending (Christopher et al., 2022). Because of the enormous financial resources involved, public procurement is also highly vulnerable to corruption, fraud, collusion, bid rigging, conflicts of interest, and inefficiencies that can significantly undermine public trust and service delivery (Christopher et al., 2022). Consequently, governments and international development organizations increasingly recognise procurement governance as an essential

Received: 18.06.2026

Accepted: 22.06.2026

Published on: 30.06.2026

component of good governance, accountability, and sustainable public administration (OECD, 2023; World Bank, 2024).

Transparency has emerged as one of the fundamental principles underpinning effective public procurement systems worldwide (Frank et al., 2023). Procurement transparency refers to the openness, accessibility, completeness, timeliness, and accuracy of procurement information throughout the procurement cycle—from procurement planning and bid invitation to evaluation, contract award, implementation, and contract completion (Alex et al., 2023). A transparent procurement system enables citizens, oversight institutions, suppliers, civil society organisations, and the media to access procurement information, monitor government expenditure, and hold public officials accountable for procurement decisions (Julius, 2024). Transparency also promotes fair competition by ensuring that all potential suppliers have equal access to procurement opportunities and information, thereby reducing opportunities for favouritism, corruption, and discriminatory practices (Julius & Nancy, 2025). According to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), transparent procurement systems improve public confidence, enhance value for money, increase competition among suppliers, and reduce procurement-related litigation and disputes (Julius & Kazaara, 2026b). Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that countries with stronger procurement transparency frameworks experience lower corruption risks and achieve greater efficiency in public expenditure management (UNCITRAL, 2023; OECD, 2023).

Over the past two decades, international organizations have increasingly promoted procurement transparency as an indispensable pillar of public sector governance (Alex et al., 2024). The World Bank emphasizes that transparent procurement systems facilitate effective competition, improve contract management, strengthen fiscal discipline, and enhance service delivery by ensuring that procurement decisions are based on objective and publicly verifiable criteria (Naughton et al., 2016). Similarly, the Open Contracting Partnership advocates for open contracting approaches that require governments to proactively disclose procurement information using internationally recognised standards, enabling real-time public scrutiny of procurement activities (Alex & Moses, 2024). Advances in digital governance have further accelerated procurement transparency through the adoption of electronic government procurement (e-GP) systems, which publish procurement plans, bidding opportunities, evaluation results, awarded contracts, and implementation progress online (Amos et al., 2024). Studies conducted across both developed and developing countries consistently demonstrate that digital procurement platforms improve transparency, reduce procurement cycle times, increase supplier participation, and minimise opportunities for corruption and administrative discretion (World Bank, 2024; Open Contracting Partnership, 2024).

Despite these global advances, public procurement remains one of the sectors most susceptible to governance failures, particularly in developing countries where institutional capacity, regulatory enforcement, and accountability mechanisms may be relatively weak (Abiodun & Charlotte, 2022). The United Nations Office on

Received: 18.06.2026

Accepted: 22.06.2026

Published on: 30.06.2026

Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that corruption in public procurement accounts for a substantial proportion of public sector financial losses globally because procurement decisions often involve large financial transactions, discretionary authority, and complex technical specifications (Julius & Nancy, 2026a). Common procurement challenges include manipulation of bidding documents, restricted competition, political interference, contract inflation, delayed project implementation, and inadequate disclosure of procurement information (Frank et al., 2023). These practices not only increase the cost of public projects but also compromise the quality of infrastructure and public services while eroding citizens' confidence in government institutions. Consequently, strengthening procurement oversight institutions has become a central priority in public financial management reforms across many developing economies (UNODC, 2023; World Bank, 2024).

In Uganda, public procurement constitutes one of the largest categories of government expenditure, accounting for a significant share of the national budget allocated to ministries, departments, agencies, and local governments (Paul et al., 2023). Recognising the need to promote efficiency, accountability, and value for money in public spending, the Government of Uganda enacted the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2003, which established the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) as the national regulatory body responsible for overseeing public procurement and disposal processes. Since its establishment, PPDA has played a central role in developing procurement regulations, issuing standard bidding documents and guidelines, building procurement capacity, conducting procurement audits and compliance assessments, investigating procurement complaints, maintaining the register of providers, and advising government on procurement policy reforms (Promise et al., 2024). Through these functions, PPDA seeks to ensure that all procuring and disposing entities conduct procurement in accordance with the principles of transparency, fairness, competition, accountability, and value for money. Recent amendments to Uganda's procurement legislation have further strengthened PPDA's regulatory mandate by promoting electronic government procurement, enhancing procurement planning, improving contract management, and increasing sanctions for procurement-related misconduct (PPDA, 2024; Government of Uganda, 2023).

Transparency remains one of the guiding principles explicitly embedded within Uganda's public procurement legal and regulatory framework (Julius & Nancy, 2026c). The PPDA Act and its accompanying Regulations require procuring entities to advertise procurement opportunities publicly, apply objective evaluation criteria, maintain comprehensive procurement records, provide feedback to unsuccessful bidders, and ensure that procurement decisions are properly documented and accessible for audit and oversight purposes (Julius & Kazaara, 2026c). In recent years, Uganda has also introduced the Electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) system to modernize procurement processes by automating procurement planning, supplier registration, bid submission, evaluation, contract award, and reporting. The adoption of e-GP is expected to improve procurement transparency by reducing manual processes, limiting human discretion, enhancing information accessibility, and facilitating continuous monitoring by oversight agencies (Racheal et al., 2023). Nevertheless, evidence from procurement audits indicates that several public entities continue to experience challenges related to incomplete procurement

documentation, delayed procurement processes, inadequate disclosure of procurement information, non-compliance with procurement regulations, and weaknesses in contract administration, suggesting that achieving full procurement transparency remains an ongoing challenge (PPDA, 2024; World Bank, 2024).

Among Uganda's public institutions, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) occupies a particularly significant position because it manages the administration and development of the nation's capital city. KCCA is responsible for delivering a wide range of public services, including road construction and maintenance, drainage infrastructure, solid waste management, public health services, education infrastructure, urban planning, environmental management, revenue collection, and administrative support services (Julius & Nancy, 2026b). The implementation of these responsibilities requires the Authority to procure substantial volumes of goods, works, and consultancy services annually, making KCCA one of the country's largest procuring and disposing entities (Julius & Desire, 2025). Because of the high monetary value, complexity, and public visibility of its procurement activities, KCCA provides an important institutional context for examining the effectiveness of procurement oversight and the extent to which regulatory interventions promote transparency in actual procurement practice. Procurement decisions made by KCCA directly influence infrastructure development, service delivery, public confidence, and the efficient utilization of taxpayers' resources within Uganda's capital city (KCCA, 2024; PPDA, 2024).

Despite the comprehensive legal framework governing procurement and the continuous oversight exercised by PPDA, procurement transparency challenges continue to be reported within several public entities, including KCCA (Julius & Nancy, 2026c). Reports issued by the Auditor General, Inspectorate of Government, and PPDA have repeatedly highlighted procurement weaknesses such as delays in procurement planning and implementation, inadequate documentation, non-compliance with procurement procedures, contract management deficiencies, and limited disclosure of procurement information (Sözüer & Spang, 2014). Public concerns have also emerged regarding delayed completion of infrastructure projects, procurement disputes, contract variations, and allegations of procurement irregularities, all of which raise questions about the effectiveness of existing oversight mechanisms in ensuring transparency throughout the procurement cycle (Lutaaya et al., 2023). Although PPDA conducts procurement audits, compliance inspections, investigations, and capacity-building programmes, the persistence of these challenges suggests that regulatory oversight alone may not automatically translate into transparent procurement practices at the entity level (Ngozi et al., 2007). Understanding how PPDA performs its oversight role and how that role influences procurement transparency is therefore essential for strengthening accountability, improving procurement governance, and enhancing public confidence in government institutions (Office of the Auditor General, 2024; PPDA, 2024).

2.0 Statement of the Problem

Although PPDA has been in operation for over two decades and has issued a comprehensive regulatory framework, concerns persist about the transparency of procurement at KCCA. Annual PPDA compliance assessments and Auditor-General reports repeatedly cite irregularities such as inadequate advertisement of bids,

Received: 18.06.2026

Accepted: 22.06.2026

Published on: 30.06.2026

weak record-keeping, contract splitting, delayed evaluation, and non-adherence to procurement plans(Kazaara et al., 2024). These recurring findings suggest a gap between the regulatory intentions of PPDA and the transparency outcomes actually realised at KCCA(Julius & Margaret, 2025). If this gap is left unexamined, it undermines value for money, erodes public trust, and exposes public funds to abuse(Julius & Nancy, 2026d). Yet there is limited empirical evidence isolating how effective PPDA's specific oversight mechanisms—regulation, compliance checks, and procurement audits—are in promoting transparency at a single high-volume entity such as KCCA. This study addresses that gap.

3. Objectives of the Study

3.1 Main Objective

To examine the effectiveness of PPDA in promoting transparency in procurement processes at Kampala Capital City Authority.

3.2 Specific Objectives

1. To assess the extent to which PPDA regulatory mechanisms enhance procurement transparency at KCCA.
2. To examine the role of PPDA compliance and audit functions in curbing procurement malpractice at KCCA.
3. To establish the relationship between PPDA oversight and transparency outcomes at KCCA.

4.0 Literature Review

Transparency in public procurement is theorized within principal-agent and stakeholder frameworks. The principal-agent perspective views citizens as principals and procurement officials as agents, with information asymmetry creating room for opportunistic behaviour; transparency reduces this asymmetry by making the agent's conduct observable(Julius & Kazaara, 2026a). Regulatory oversight bodies such as PPDA function as monitoring institutions that reduce the cost of observing agent behaviour(Alex & Moses, 2024).

Studies across sub-Saharan Africa consistently report that the existence of a procurement law is necessary but not sufficient for transparency(Deus, 2023). Enforcement capacity, sanction credibility, and information systems mediate whether laws translate into practice. Scholars examining Uganda's procurement regime have noted that PPDA's standard bidding documents, mandatory advertisement thresholds, and complaints-review mechanism have raised formal transparency, but that compliance remains uneven because of understaffing, political interference, and limited automation(Nicholas & Nancy, 2024).

The literature on procurement audits indicates that periodic compliance checks deter malpractice mainly where findings are followed by enforcement. Where sanctions are delayed or rarely applied, the deterrent effect weakens(Phionah et al., 2023). Similarly, electronic government procurement (e-GP) is associated with higher transparency because it standardises processes and creates audit trails. Uganda's gradual rollout of e-GP is therefore expected to strengthen transparency over time(Frank et al., 2023). A gap remains in entity-level studies that quantify the contribution of distinct PPDA mechanisms to transparency, which this study addresses at KCCA.

5.0 Methodology

The study adopted a cross-sectional research design combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative component measured perceptions of transparency and PPDA oversight through structured questionnaires using a five-point Likert scale, while the qualitative component used key-informant interviews to contextualise the findings(Anwar et al., 2022).

The target population comprised procurement and disposal unit staff, members of the contracts committee, user department heads, internal audit staff at KCCA, and registered providers(Sarah et al., 2024). Using Krejcie and Morgan's table, a sample of 132 respondents was drawn through stratified and purposive sampling. Data were analysed using SPSS(Nelson et al., 2022). Descriptive statistics summarized responses; Pearson correlation established relationships; and multiple linear regression estimated the combined effect of regulatory mechanisms and compliance/audit functions on transparency(Julius et al., 2024). Reliability was confirmed with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.82, and validity was ensured through expert review yielding a content validity index of 0.79. Ethical considerations of informed consent, confidentiality, and voluntary participation were observed.

6.0 Results and Interpretation

6.1 Response Rate and Respondent Profile

Of the 132 questionnaires distributed, 118 were returned fully completed, giving a response rate of 89.4%, which is adequate for analysis and generalisation. The distribution of respondents is summarised below.

Table 1: Respondent profile (N = 118)

Category	Sub-group	Frequency	Percent
Role	Procurement/PDU staff	26	22.0
	User department heads	34	28.8
	Contracts committee	12	10.2
	Internal audit	10	8.5
	Providers	36	30.5
Experience	Below 3 years	31	26.3
	3–7 years	54	45.8
	Above 7 years	33	27.9

Source: Primary Data, 2025

The findings presented in Table 1 described the demographic characteristics of the respondents according to their organizational roles and years of experience. The results indicated that providers constituted the largest category of respondents, accounting for 36 respondents (30.5%). This finding suggested that service providers formed a substantial proportion of the study participants, reflecting their active involvement in public procurement processes and their direct interaction with procuring and disposing entities. Their participation provided valuable perspectives regarding procurement practices, transparency, and compliance with procurement regulations.

The findings further revealed that user department heads comprised 34 respondents (28.8%), making them the second largest group represented in the study. This suggested that departmental managers played an important

role in procurement planning, requisitioning, and monitoring procurement activities within their respective departments. Their considerable representation implied that the study captured the views of key personnel responsible for identifying procurement needs and ensuring that procurement processes aligned with institutional objectives.

In addition, procurement and disposal unit (PDU) staff accounted for 26 respondents (22.0%). This finding indicated that procurement professionals constituted a significant proportion of the respondents, reflecting their central responsibility for implementing procurement procedures, ensuring regulatory compliance, and managing procurement documentation. Their responses were therefore important in assessing the effectiveness of procurement systems and regulatory mechanisms within the institutions studied.

The results also showed that contracts committee members represented 12 respondents (10.2%), while internal audit staff constituted the smallest category with 10 respondents (8.5%). Although these groups were comparatively smaller, their inclusion was essential because they are directly responsible for procurement oversight, contract approvals, and independent monitoring of procurement activities. Their participation enriched the study by providing insights into governance, accountability, and compliance monitoring within public procurement systems. Regarding respondents' work experience, the findings revealed that the majority had accumulated between three and seven years of experience, representing 54 respondents (45.8%). This suggested that nearly half of the respondents possessed adequate professional experience to provide informed opinions regarding procurement practices. Furthermore, 33 respondents (27.9%) had worked for more than seven years, indicating that a considerable proportion of participants possessed extensive practical knowledge and institutional experience. Finally, 31 respondents (26.3%) had less than three years of experience, suggesting that newer employees also contributed to the study by providing perspectives based on recent exposure to procurement processes.

6.2 Descriptive Statistics

Respondents rated statements on regulatory mechanisms, compliance/audit functions, and transparency outcomes. Mean scores between 3.40 and 4.19 were interpreted as agreement, 2.60–3.39 as neutral, and below 2.60 as disagreement.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for study variables

Statement	Mean	Std. Dev	Interpretation
Bids are advertised as required by PPDA	3.92	0.74	Agree
Procurement records are properly kept	3.21	0.98	Neutral
PPDA compliance checks are conducted regularly	3.68	0.81	Agree
Audit findings lead to timely corrective action	2.74	1.02	Neutral
Providers can access procurement information	3.55	0.86	Agree

Complaints are handled fairly and promptly	3.02	0.95	Neutral
Overall procurement is transparent	3.47	0.79	Agree

Source: Primary Data, 2025

The findings presented in Table 2 indicated that respondents generally expressed positive perceptions regarding several aspects of public procurement, although some areas demonstrated only moderate performance. The statement that bids are advertised as required by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets (PPDA) regulations recorded the highest mean score of 3.92 with a standard deviation of 0.74, indicating that respondents agreed with the statement (Alex et al., 2024). This finding suggested that procurement entities largely complied with legal requirements governing the advertisement of procurement opportunities. The relatively low standard deviation further indicated that respondents shared similar opinions regarding this aspect of procurement practice, reflecting consistency in the implementation of procurement advertising procedures.

The statement concerning PPDA compliance checks being conducted regularly obtained a mean score of 3.68 with a standard deviation of 0.81, which was also interpreted as agreement. This suggested that respondents generally believed compliance monitoring activities were conducted regularly to ensure adherence to procurement regulations (Innocent et al., 2023). The relatively low variability in responses implied that compliance reviews were commonly recognized as an integral component of procurement management within the institutions studied.

Similarly, respondents agreed that providers could access procurement information, as reflected by a mean score of 3.55 and a standard deviation of 0.86. This finding suggested that procurement entities generally promoted openness by making procurement information reasonably accessible to service providers and other stakeholders. Such accessibility was indicative of efforts to enhance fairness, competitiveness, and transparency throughout procurement processes (Faith et al., 2023).

The overall perception that procurement processes were transparent recorded a mean score of 3.47 with a standard deviation of 0.79, indicating agreement. This finding suggested that respondents generally considered procurement activities to be conducted openly and in accordance with established procurement procedures. The relatively consistent responses implied that transparency had been reasonably integrated into procurement operations, although opportunities for further improvement still existed.

Conversely, the statement that procurement records were properly kept obtained a mean score of 3.21 with a standard deviation of 0.98, which was interpreted as neutral. This finding suggested that respondents held mixed opinions regarding the adequacy of procurement record management. The relatively higher standard deviation reflected considerable variation in perceptions, implying that while some institutions maintained comprehensive procurement records, others experienced challenges in documentation and record keeping.

Likewise, the statement that complaints were handled fairly and promptly recorded a mean score of 3.02 with a standard deviation of 0.95, which also reflected a neutral response. This finding suggested that respondents were uncertain about the effectiveness and timeliness of procurement complaint-handling mechanisms. The variability in responses implied inconsistencies across institutions regarding grievance management and dispute resolution processes (Kazaara et al., 2024). Finally, the statement that audit findings led to timely corrective action registered the lowest mean score of 2.74 with a standard deviation of 1.02, representing another neutral response. This finding suggested that respondents were less convinced that audit recommendations were consistently implemented within the required timeframes. The relatively high standard deviation indicated considerable differences in institutional practices, suggesting that while some organizations responded promptly to audit findings, others experienced delays in implementing corrective measures.

6.3 Correlation Analysis

Pearson correlation was used to test the association between PPDA oversight dimensions and transparency.

Table 3: Correlation matrix

Variable	Regulatory	Compliance/Audit	Transp.
Regulatory mechanisms	1		
Compliance/audit functions	0.57**	1	
Transparency outcomes	0.61**	0.59**	1

Note: ** correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Primary Data, 2025

The correlation analysis presented in Table 3 revealed statistically significant positive relationships among the study variables at the 0.01 level of significance. The findings indicated that stronger regulatory mechanisms and more effective compliance functions were associated with improved transparency outcomes in public procurement.

Specifically, the relationship between regulatory mechanisms and compliance and audit functions was found to be positive and statistically significant ($r = 0.57$, $p < 0.01$). This finding suggested that institutions with stronger procurement regulations also tended to exhibit more effective compliance monitoring and audit practices. The moderate positive correlation implied that improvements in regulatory frameworks were associated with corresponding improvements in institutional oversight and accountability mechanisms.

The findings further revealed a strong positive relationship between regulatory mechanisms and transparency outcomes ($r = 0.61$, $p < 0.01$). This suggested that stronger implementation of procurement regulations contributed to higher levels of transparency within procurement processes (Ngozi et al., 2007). Institutions that effectively enforced procurement laws and regulations were therefore more likely to demonstrate openness, fairness, and accountability in procurement activities. The statistically significant correlation underscored the critical role played by regulatory frameworks in promoting transparent public procurement systems. Similarly, compliance and audit functions exhibited a statistically significant moderate positive relationship with transparency outcomes

Received: 18.06.2026

Accepted: 22.06.2026

Published on: 30.06.2026

($r = 0.59$, $p < 0.01$). This finding indicated that effective compliance monitoring and audit activities were associated with improved procurement transparency. Regular compliance reviews, internal audits, and monitoring activities therefore appeared to strengthen accountability while minimizing opportunities for irregularities in procurement processes.

6.4 Regression Analysis

Multiple linear regression estimated the joint effect of the two oversight dimensions on transparency outcomes.

Table 4: Model summary and coefficients

Predictor	Beta (β)	t-value	Sig. (p)
(Constant)	—	3.11	0.002
Regulatory mechanisms	0.41	5.02	0.000
Compliance/audit functions	0.33	4.08	0.000
R = 0.735; R ² = 0.540; Adj. R ² = 0.532			
F(2,115) = 67.5; p = 0.000			

Source: Primary Data, 2025

The multiple regression analysis presented in Table 4 examined the extent to which regulatory mechanisms and compliance or audit functions predicted transparency outcomes in public procurement. The overall regression model was found to be statistically significant ($F(2,115) = 67.5$, $p = 0.000$), indicating that the predictor variables jointly explained a significant proportion of the variation in procurement transparency (Nelson et al., 2023). The multiple correlation coefficient ($R = 0.735$) indicated a strong positive relationship between the independent variables and transparency outcomes. Furthermore, the coefficient of determination ($R^2 = 0.540$) showed that 54.0% of the variation in procurement transparency was explained by regulatory mechanisms and compliance or audit functions. The adjusted coefficient of determination (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.532$) indicated that after adjusting for the number of predictors included in the model, approximately 53.2% of the variation in transparency outcomes remained explained by the model, while the remaining 46.8% was attributable to other factors not examined in the study.

Among the individual predictors, regulatory mechanisms emerged as the strongest predictor of procurement transparency with a standardized beta coefficient of $\beta = 0.41$, a t-value of 5.02, and a highly significant p-value of 0.000. This finding suggested that strengthening procurement regulations, enforcing legal requirements, and ensuring adherence to procurement policies significantly enhanced transparency within procurement processes. The results implied that effective regulatory frameworks provided the foundation for accountability and openness in public procurement.

Similarly, compliance and audit functions exerted a statistically significant positive influence on procurement transparency, with a standardized beta coefficient of $\beta = 0.33$, a t-value of 4.08, and a p-value of 0.000. This finding indicated that institutions that regularly conducted compliance reviews, internal audits, and monitoring

activities experienced significantly higher levels of procurement transparency. Although its contribution was slightly lower than that of regulatory mechanisms, compliance and audit functions remained an important determinant of transparent procurement practices.

7.0 Discussion of Results

The findings confirm that PPDA oversight is positively and significantly associated with procurement transparency at KCCA, consistent with principal-agent theory: by monitoring agents and reducing information asymmetry, PPDA improves the observability of procurement conduct. The stronger effect of regulatory mechanisms echoes literature suggesting that clear rules, standard bidding documents, and advertisement thresholds create the structural conditions for openness.

However, the neutral ratings on corrective action and complaint handling mirror regional findings that audits deter malpractice only where sanctions are timely and credible. At KCCA, delays between audit findings and enforcement appear to blunt the deterrent value of compliance checks. The moderate overall transparency score, alongside the 46% of unexplained variance, points to institutional constraints—capacity gaps, political interference, and incomplete automation—that limit PPDA’s effectiveness. These results therefore portray PPDA as moderately effective: strong on rule-setting and monitoring, weaker on enforcement follow-through.

8. Conclusions

The study concludes that PPDA has made a positive and statistically significant contribution to procurement transparency at KCCA, primarily through its regulatory mechanisms and, to a lesser extent, its compliance and audit functions. Nonetheless, effectiveness is only moderate because enforcement of audit findings is slow, complaint resolution is inconsistent, and record-keeping is weak. PPDA’s influence is thus real but incomplete, constrained by capacity and enforcement gaps rather than by the adequacy of its rules.

9.0 Recommendations

PPDA should institute time-bound enforcement of audit findings with mandatory reporting on corrective action to strengthen the deterrent effect of compliance checks.

KCCA should accelerate adoption of electronic government procurement (e-GP) to create automatic audit trails, reduce manual record-keeping errors, and widen provider access to information.

The complaints-review mechanism should be resourced for faster turnaround, with published timelines and outcomes to reinforce fairness.

PPDA and KCCA should invest in continuous capacity building for procurement and audit staff and insulate procurement decisions from political interference through clearer accountability lines.

Regular publication of KCCA procurement plans, awards, and contract performance should be made routine to sustain public trust.

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Received: 18.06.2026

Accepted: 22.06.2026

Published on: 30.06.2026

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