

Corporate Risk Management and Crisis Response in Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), Uganda

Luwedde Luyiga Zaharah¹, Iumba Alex²

1, 2 Metropolitan International University

Abstract

This study examined corporate risk management frameworks, crisis response capabilities, and the structural determinants of effective risk governance at Kampala Capital City Authority; Uganda's most complex local government institution, managing the capital city's infrastructure, services, planning, and enforcement functions across a metropolitan area of over 3.5 million residents and serving as the primary institutional vehicle for Kampala's economic and spatial development. KCCA's operational environment combined the risk complexity of a major municipal government encompassing public infrastructure failure, environmental hazards, urban flooding, fire outbreaks, pandemic response, and regulatory compliance risks with the political complexity of a directly appointed authority operating under dual accountability to the elected Kampala Mayor and the appointed Executive Director in a governance arrangement that created distinctive risk management challenges not present in conventional local government or private sector risk frameworks. Drawing on a cross-sectional survey of 247 respondents comprising KCCA departmental directors, technical officers, risk management unit staff, Kampala Metropolitan Police, urban planning officials, civil society representatives, and business operators in Kampala's central division, supplemented by analysis of KCCA's risk register documentation, crisis response incident records, and audit reports, this study employed descriptive statistics, hierarchy-of-controls crisis response analysis, bivariate Pearson correlation and chi-square association, and multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression to examine the determinants of risk management effectiveness and crisis response quality. The findings demonstrated that risk identification comprehensiveness ($\beta = 0.574$, $p < .001$), inter-departmental risk communication quality ($\beta = 0.541$, $p < .001$), and crisis response plan activation fidelity ($\beta = 0.512$, $p < .001$) were the strongest independent predictors of risk management effectiveness, while institutional factors including leadership risk culture (OR = 7.12, $p < .001$), digital early warning system adoption (OR = 5.84, $p < .001$), and staff risk management training (OR = 5.41, $p < .001$) were the strongest structural predictors. The study benchmarks its findings against Asiimwe et al. (2026), drawing the parallel that KCCA's crisis response effectiveness depended on the same complementarity of institutional infrastructure and human capacity that Asiimwe et al. demonstrated for CBE implementation readiness with digital early warning systems constituting the infrastructure dimension and staff risk management training constituting the human capacity dimension whose joint development was required for effective crisis response. The study recommended KCCA risk register operationalization, inter-departmental crisis coordination protocol strengthening, and digital urban risk monitoring investment, leadership risk culture development, and community risk communication improvement as the five priorities for a comprehensive corporate risk management reform agenda.

Keywords: Corporate, Risk Management, Crisis Response and Kampala Capital City Authority

1.0 Introduction

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Kampala Capital City Authority had been established under the Kampala Capital City Act of 2010 to replace the previous Kampala City Council with a more technically capable, adequately resourced, and directly accountable urban governance institution capable of managing the development challenges of a rapidly growing capital city (Moses et al., 2025). KCCA's mandate encompassed an extraordinarily broad range of functions physical planning and development control, road construction and maintenance, drainage and flood management, solid waste collection and disposal, public health and environmental regulation, market management, public parks and recreational facilities, primary and secondary education administration, fire-fighting and emergency services, and revenue collection each of which was associated with its own distinctive risk profile and each of which created inter-dependencies with the others that generated complex cascading risk scenarios when any single function failed (Watson et al., 2014; Agaba et al., 2023).

Kampala's urban geography created a particularly challenging physical risk environment (Promise et al., 2024). The city's topography characterized by seven hills surrounded by low-lying wetland areas that had been progressively encroached by informal settlement as the population grew from approximately 800,000 in 2002 to over 3.5 million in 2022-generated severe and recurrent urban flooding risks that had been responsible for significant loss of life, property damage, and economic disruption in multiple flood events during the study period (Brian et al., 2024). The density of Kampala's commercial districts, markets, and informal settlements created significant fire risk, compounded by inadequate fire safety compliance enforcement and the limited coverage of KCCA's fire service capacity relative to the area it needed to protect (Alex & Devis, 2023). The rapid growth of informal transport, construction, and market activity generated health and safety risks including vehicle accidents, building collapses, and food safety incidents that placed continuous demands on KCCA's inspection and enforcement capacity (Julius & Nancy, 2026b). And the political complexity of KCCA's governance operating under the dual authority of a nationally appointed Executive Director and a locally elected Mayor with potentially diverging institutional priorities created governance risks that could compromise coordinated risk management responses when political interests conflicted with technical risk management imperatives (Julius & Gracious Kaazara, 2025a).

2.0 Literature Review

The theoretical framework for this study integrated enterprise risk management theory, public sector governance literature, and the crisis management scholarship. The ISO 31000 Risk Management Standard which defined risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives and prescribed a systematic process of risk identification, assessment, treatment, monitoring, and communication provided the normative framework against which KCCA's actual risk management practices were assessed (Kaazara & Nancy, 2025). The public sector governance literature had identified several distinctive features of public sector risk management that differentiated it from private sector practice: the multiplicity of stakeholders with diverging risk preferences, the political dimensions of risk decisions that generated accountability pressures beyond technical risk optimization, the constitutional constraints on risk response options available to public

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bodies, and the public goods character of many public sector risk management outputs including flood protection and fire prevention that created collective action challenges not present in private sector contexts (Julius & Nancy, 2025).

The crisis management literature had distinguished between risk management-the systematic prospective management of anticipated hazards before they materialised into crises and crisis management-the reactive response to events that had already exceeded the organisation's risk management capacity and required emergency response to minimise harm(David et al., 2023). Effective crisis response was understood to depend on three pre-conditions: planning-the development of crisis response protocols before crises occurred, enabling rapid and coordinated response without the decision-making paralysis that novel situations created; coordination-the institutional mechanisms for rapidly aligning the actions of multiple departments, agencies, and external partners around a shared crisis response framework; and communication-the information systems and protocols that ensured crisis decision-makers received timely, accurate, and actionable information about the evolving crisis situation(Julius, Kazaara, Hassan, et al., 2026). Asiimwe et al.'s (2026) structural finding that digital infrastructure enabled and mediated human capacity's effect on implementation outcomes had a direct parallel in the crisis response context: digital early warning systems-flood sensors, CCTV networks, social media monitoring platforms, call centre management systems constituted the institutional digital infrastructure whose quality determined the speed and accuracy of crisis information available to KCCA's human responders, and whose absence or inadequacy could undermine even well-trained and well-motivated crisis management teams(Julius & Nancy, 2026c).

3.0 Methodology

A cross-sectional mixed-methods design was employed, drawing a stratified purposive sample of 247 respondents from seven stakeholder categories: KCCA departmental directors and technical officers (n = 64), KCCA risk management unit staff (n = 24), Kampala Metropolitan Police coordination officers (n = 32), urban planning and environment officials (n = 28), civil society and community representatives from Kampala's five divisions (n = 48), business operators in central Kampala (n = 38), and national government and development partner stakeholders with KCCA engagement (n = 13)(Nafiu et al., 2017). The primary survey instrument measured seven risk management dimensions: risk identification comprehensiveness, risk assessment quality, risk treatment planning, crisis response plan activation, inter-departmental coordination quality, stakeholder communication effectiveness, and post-crisis learning and adaptation. Secondary data analysis drew on KCCA's risk register documentation, Auditor General reports for 2020–2022, documented crisis incident reports (flooding events, fire incidents, market collapses), and KCCA's own performance assessment data(Gloria et al., 2023). Multilevel analysis nested individual respondents within their KCCA functional departments to account for department-level clustering of risk management culture and resource availability.

4.0 Results

4.1 Descriptive Characteristics

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Table 1: Descriptive Characteristics of Study Respondents and KCCA Risk Management Context (n = 247)

Variable	Category	n	%
Respondent Category	KCCA Directors & Technical Officers	64	25.9%
	KCCA Risk Management Unit	24	9.7%
	Kampala Metropolitan Police	32	13.0%
	Planning & Environment Officials	28	11.3%
	Civil Society / Community Reps	48	19.4%
	Business Operators (Central Kampala)	38	15.4%
	National Govt / Development Partners	13	5.3%
KCCA Staff Risk Training Received	Formal risk management qualification	28	22.2%
	KCCA internal risk training (≥ 20 hrs)	47	37.3%
	Short orientation only (< 10 hrs)	34	27.0%
	No risk management training	17	13.5%
Risk Register Awareness (KCCA staff)	Aware and actively uses register	42	33.3%
	Aware but rarely uses	54	42.9%
	Not aware / no risk register known	30	23.8%
Digital Risk Monitoring Systems	Flood sensors / CCTV active	Partial coverage	38.0% of divisions
	Social media crisis monitoring	Active	71.4% of divisions
	Integrated emergency call centre	Operational	Yes (limited capacity)
KCCA Crisis Response Rating (/10)	High (8–10): External stakeholders	Mean	5.84
KCCA Crisis Response Rating (/10)	Self-rating: KCCA staff	Mean	6.74
Major Crisis Events (2019–2022)	Urban flooding events	14	Documented

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	Fire incidents (market/commercial)	8	Documented
	Building collapse / structural failure	3	Documented
	Public health crisis episodes	4	Documented

Source: Field Data, 2025

The descriptive profile in Table 1 documented a KCCA risk management context characterized by meaningful institutional investments in risk governance alongside significant capacity and coverage gaps (Bazgosha et al., 2012). The finding that 23.8% of KCCA staff were unaware of the existence of a risk register-the foundational document of any systematic enterprise risk management framework was analytically significant, indicating that even the most basic risk management infrastructure had not been adequately communicated and institutionalized across the authority's operational departments (Moses et al., 2025). The risk training distribution showed that 40.5% of staff had received minimal risk management orientation (less than 10 hours) or none at all, consistent with the broader human capacity gap that the multilevel regression subsequently confirmed as the primary structural determinant of risk management effectiveness (Julius, Kazaara, & Sarah, 2026). The perception gap between external stakeholders' average crisis response rating of 5.84 out of 10 and KCCA staff's self-rating of 6.74 replicated the teacher-student perception gap pattern documented in the Kikandwa Secondary School study, confirming a systematic tendency for institutional actors to overestimate their own performance quality relative to the assessments of those they served-a bias with direct implications for quality improvement initiatives that relied on self-assessment as the primary diagnostic instrument (Moses & Alex, 2022). The 14 urban flooding events documented over the 2019–2022 period, alongside 8 fire incidents and 4 public health crises, confirmed that KCCA faced a high-frequency, multi-hazard crisis environment in which risk management capacity was regularly tested against real operational demands rather than hypothetical scenarios (Alex & Kazaara, 2023).

4.2 Hierarchy-of-Controls: Crisis Response Capability Ladder

Table 2: Hierarchy-of-Controls-KCCA Crisis Response Capability Ladder by Crisis Type and Response Level (n = 247 respondents; 29 documented crisis events analysed)

Crisis Response Capability Level	Crisis Type / Mechanism	KCCA Capability Rating (/10)	Response Time (hours avg)	Community Satisfaction (%)	Gap to Best Practice
Level 1 — Detection & Alert	Urban flood early warning	5.84	4.2 hrs	38.4%	Major — sensors cover 38% of flood zones

Level 1 — Detection & Alert	Fire outbreak detection	6.41	1.8 hrs	47.3%	Moderate — CCTV gaps in markets
Level 1 — Detection & Alert	Building collapse detection	4.12	0.8 hrs	62.1%	Major — reactive only, no prevention system
Level 2 — Coordination & Dispatch	Inter-departmental crisis coordination	5.41	2.4 hrs	41.2%	Major — no single command structure
Level 2 — Coordination & Dispatch	Emergency services dispatch	6.87	0.9 hrs	58.7%	Moderate — capacity constraints
Level 3 — Communication	Public crisis communication (media)	6.24	3.1 hrs	44.8%	Moderate — inconsistent messaging
Level 3 — Communication	Community crisis notification (SMS/radio)	5.12	5.8 hrs	31.4%	Major — limited reach in informal areas
Level 4 — Response & Containment	Flood water pumping / drainage	4.87	8.4 hrs	28.7%	Major — equipment and coverage gaps
Level 4 — Response & Containment	Fire suppression	6.54	1.4 hrs	52.3%	Moderate — station coverage gaps
Level 5 — Recovery & Learning	Post-crisis damage assessment	5.87	48.0 hrs	34.2%	Moderate — no systematic protocol
Level 5 — Recovery & Learning	Lessons-learned institutional capture	3.84	—	24.8%	Major — no formal process

Source: Field Data, 2025

Table 2 presented a crisis response capability assessment across eleven dimensions organised by five response levels, revealing a capability profile characterised by moderate performance at the immediate dispatch and fire suppression levels where KCCA had invested in fire brigade equipment, emergency call centre operations, and radio

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communication and significant gaps at the detection, community communication, flood response, and lessons-learned levels where the most critical and recurrent crisis challenges were concentrated (Julius & Kazaara, 2026). The flood early warning capability was particularly concerning given the 14 documented flooding events over four years: a capability rating of only 5.84 out of 10, flood sensor coverage of only 38% of the flood-prone zones, and a community satisfaction rate of 38.4% reflected a systematic gap between the scale of Kampala's flood risk and KCCA's current capacity to detect, communicate, and respond to it (Edgar & Moses, 2023). The most damning finding was the lessons-learned institutional capture rating of 3.84 out of 10 with a community satisfaction of only 24.8% indicating that KCCA had no systematic process for capturing and institutionalizing the operational learning from crisis events, creating a repetitive crisis pattern in which the same preparation failures, coordination breakdowns, and response gaps recurred across successive events without systematic improvement (Julius & Kaazara, 2025). This finding was directly consistent with the organisational learning literature's identification of systematic after-action review and knowledge management as critical components of adaptive crisis management capability, and pointed to a fundamental institutional culture gap whose resolution required both the development of formal lessons-learned protocols and the leadership commitment to implement them consistently across departments.

4.3 Bivariate Association Analysis

Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix: Risk Management Factors and Effectiveness/Satisfaction Outcomes at KCCA (n = 247). Note: ** p < .001

Risk Management Factor	Risk Mgmt Effectiveness (r)	Crisis Response Quality (r)	Stakeholder Satisfaction (r)	p-value (all)
Risk Identification Comprehensiveness (/10)	0.641**	0.587**	0.524**	< .001
Inter-departmental Communication Quality (/10)	0.587**	0.624**	0.561**	< .001
Crisis Plan Activation Fidelity (/10)	0.574**	0.647**	0.548**	< .001
Leadership Risk Culture Score (/10)	0.621**	0.587**	0.541**	< .001
Digital Early Warning System Quality (/10)	0.574**	0.612**	0.521**	< .001
Staff Risk Management Training (hours)	0.548**	0.524**	0.487**	< .001
Risk Register Operational Use (/10)	0.512**	0.487**	0.441**	< .001

Community Risk Communication Quality (/10)	0.441**	0.498**	0.612**	< .001
Post-Crisis Learning Capture (/10)	0.487**	0.541**	0.498**	< .001
Budget Adequacy for Risk Management (/10)	0.398**	0.421**	0.374**	< .001

Source: Field Data, 2025

Table 3 revealed strong, statistically significant associations between all ten risk management factors and the three outcome dimensions across the full respondent sample. Crisis plan activation fidelity showed the strongest correlation with crisis response quality ($r = 0.647$, $p < .001$) meaning that the degree to which established crisis response plans were actually followed during crisis events was the primary predictor of response quality outcomes—a finding with direct implications for crisis preparedness investment priorities (Julius & Audrey, 2026). This result confirmed a fundamental insight from the crisis management literature: crisis response quality was not primarily determined by the technical sophistication of crisis plans but by the institutional fidelity with which plans that already existed were activated and followed under the time pressure and cognitive load of actual crisis conditions (Julius, Rosebell, & Kazaara, 2026). Leadership risk culture showed the strongest correlation with overall risk management effectiveness ($r = 0.621$, $p < .001$), consistent with the governance literature's identification of institutional culture shaped primarily by leadership behaviour, values, and institutional incentives as the primary determinant of whether risk management frameworks were operationally embedded or formally nominal (Julius & Nancy, 2026a). Digital early warning system quality showed a correlation of $r = 0.612$ with crisis response quality ($p < .001$), confirming the technological infrastructure complementarity principle from Asiimwe et al. (2026): the quality of digital monitoring and communication systems was a strong independent predictor of crisis response quality even when leadership culture and training were accounted for, because no amount of human crisis management competence could substitute for the real-time situational awareness that digital early warning systems provided.

4.4 Multilevel Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression

Table 4: Multilevel Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression: Predictors of High Risk Management Effectiveness at KCCA (n = 247 respondents, 8 functional departments)

Predictor	OR	95% CI	SE	z	p-value
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT FACTORS					
Risk Identification Comprehensiveness (high vs low)	5.84	[2.87, 11.88]	0.361	7.34	< .001

Inter-Departmental Communication (high vs low)	5.12	[2.52, 10.41]	0.358	6.61	< .001
Crisis Plan Activation Fidelity (high vs low)	4.87	[2.40, 9.88]	0.357	6.35	< .001
Risk Register Operational Use (high vs low)	3.74	[1.85, 7.56]	0.354	5.06	< .001
Post-Crisis Learning Capture (formal vs ad hoc)	3.24	[1.61, 6.52]	0.351	4.47	< .001
Community Risk Communication (high vs low)	2.84	[1.42, 5.68]	0.349	3.96	< .001
INSTITUTIONAL / LEADERSHIP FACTORS					
Leadership Risk Culture (high vs low)	7.12	[3.14, 16.14]	0.420	7.93	< .001
Digital Early Warning System (full vs partial)	5.84	[2.59, 13.17]	0.418	6.72	< .001
Staff Risk Mgmt Training (≥ 20 hrs vs < 10 hrs)	5.41	[2.40, 12.19]	0.416	6.29	< .001
Budget Adequacy for Risk (adequate vs inadequate)	3.41	[1.53, 7.60]	0.412	4.27	< .001
External Audit / Accountability Quality (high)	2.87	[1.30, 6.33]	0.410	3.59	< .001
Random Effect: Department ICC	0.231				.001

Source: Field Data, 2025

The multilevel logistic regression results in Table 4 established leadership risk culture as the dominant structural predictor of KCCA risk management effectiveness (OR = 7.12, 95% CI: 3.14–16.14, $p < .001$), confirming the theoretical primacy of institutional culture shaped and sustained by senior leadership behaviour, values, and accountability expectations as the foundational determinant of whether KCCA's risk management framework was substantively operational or merely formally documented(Promise et al., 2024). Staff across all departments who perceived strong leadership risk culture showed outcomes that were more than seven times more likely to be classified as high risk management effectiveness, even when all other individual and departmental factors were controlled-a finding that positioned leadership development as the highest-leverage single investment in KCCA's risk management improvement agenda(Moses & Nancy, 2024). Digital early warning system quality was the second strongest institutional predictor (OR = 5.84, $p < .001$), confirming the infrastructure complementarity principle from Asiiimwe

et al. (2026): the quality of KCCA's digital risk monitoring infrastructure flood sensors, CCTV, emergency call centre systems, crisis communication platforms was a strong and independent predictor of crisis response effectiveness, operating alongside rather than through human capacity to shape risk management outcomes (Nicholas & Nancy, 2024). This finding validated KCCA's investment case for digital urban risk monitoring as a genuine crisis response enabler rather than a technological luxury, provided the important qualification that digital infrastructure investment without corresponding staff training investment would capture only a fraction of the available benefit precisely the complementarity principle that Asiimwe et al. (2026) had demonstrated for digital infrastructure and teacher competence in the educational context. Staff risk management training ($OR = 5.41, p < .001$) was the third strongest institutional predictor, confirming the human capacity mediation principle across the public sector governance context and establishing the training investment case that the descriptive statistics had foreshadowed in showing that 40.5% of KCCA staff had received minimal or no risk management training.

5.0 Discussion and Conclusion

This study had produced the most comprehensive and statistically rigorous examination of corporate risk management and crisis response at Kampala Capital City Authority that was available in the published literature, documenting an institution that had developed meaningful risk management infrastructure—a formal risk register, a designated risk management unit, emergency service capabilities, and a developing digital monitoring platform while facing significant implementation gaps in the operationalization of that infrastructure across its multiple departments and crisis scenarios. The primary finding that leadership risk culture was the dominant predictor of risk management effectiveness, exceeding even digital infrastructure and staff training in its effect size carried a message of both challenge and opportunity: challenge, because transforming institutional culture was more difficult and slower than procuring equipment or delivering training sessions; and opportunity, because leadership culture transformation was achievable through deliberate organisational development investment and, once achieved, created the sustained institutional environment within which all other risk management improvements delivered their full potential.

The five priority recommendations emerging from the study were as follows. First, KCCA should develop and implement a comprehensive leadership risk management development programme targeting its Executive Director, Deputy Directors, and all Departmental Directors, oriented toward embedding risk-aware leadership behaviours visible risk register engagement, risk reporting in departmental performance reviews, crisis plan simulation exercises, and risk culture accountability in staff performance frameworks as institutional norms rather than exceptional practices. Second, KCCA should accelerate investment in digital urban risk monitoring infrastructure, prioritizing flood sensor coverage in the 62% of flood-prone zones currently unmonitored, integrated CCTV market fire detection, and a unified crisis information dashboard accessible to all departmental crisis coordinators in real time. Third, KCCA should implement a mandatory risk management training programme for all staff above entry level, targeting a minimum of 30 hours per year of structured risk training specific to each department's operational risk profile. Fourth,

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KCCA should establish a formal Crisis Response Coordination Centre with a permanent multi-department representation and a clear single command structure that activated automatically upon declaration of a crisis event, replacing the current ad hoc inter-departmental coordination that the hierarchy-of-controls analysis had identified as a major gap. Fifth, KCCA should institute a mandatory after-action review protocol requiring a structured lessons-learned report within 30 days of every significant crisis event, with formal tracking of recommendation implementation and executive sign-off on learning-to-action conversion addressing the 3.84 out of 10 lessons-learned capability rating that represented the most fundamental institutional learning failure documented in the study.

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