Abstract
This study examined the impact of Constituency Development Funds (CDF) on parliamentary accountability and legislative independence in Uganda, drawing on a sample of 312 respondents comprising Members of Parliament, parliamentary staff, civil society representatives, and community leaders. Employing a quantitative cross-sectional survey design, the study collected primary data using a structured, pre-tested Likert-scale questionnaire. Statistical analyses encompassed univariate descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation analysis, multiple linear regression, and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) using maximum likelihood estimation. Results revealed that CDF transparency (β = .42, p < .001) and CDF oversight mechanisms (β = .35, p < .001) were significant positive predictors of parliamentary accountability, while CDF political interference exhibited a significant negative effect (β = -.28, p = .001). The regression model explained 52.1% of the variance in parliamentary accountability (R² = .521, F(3, 308) = 111.7, p < .001). SEM path analysis confirmed the structural relationships, with model fit indices indicating excellent model-data correspondence (CFI = 0.963, RMSEA = 0.048, χ²/df = 1.87). Parliamentary accountability significantly predicted both legislative independence (β = 0.51, p < .001) and constituency representation (β = 0.44, p < .001). The study concluded that CDF management quality—particularly transparency and oversight—is a critical determinant of parliamentary accountability in Uganda. Recommendations included strengthening CDF audit frameworks, depoliticizing fund allocation, and enacting independent parliamentary oversight legislation.
Keywords
Constituency Development Funds, parliamentary accountability, legislative independence, Uganda, SEM, governance