This study investigated the structural relationships among political will, institutional independence, and anticorruption enforcement outcomes within Uganda's anti-corruption institutional ecosystem, and further tested whether resource adequacy mediated the pathway between institutional independence and enforcement outcomes. Guided by principal-agent and institutional theories of anti-corruption governance, the study adopted a cross-sectional quantitative design and drew a sample of 384 respondents from six categories of anti-corruption actors, namely the Office of the Inspectorate of Government, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the Uganda Police Force's Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Directorate, the Judiciary's Anti-Corruption Division, the Auditor General's Office, and civil society anti-corruption watchdog organisations. Data were collected using a structured, pretested questionnaire employing five-point Likert-type indicators for political will, institutional independence, resource adequacy, and enforcement outcomes, each demonstrating strong internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha ranging from 0.828 to 0.872). Data were analysed at the univariate level using frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations; at the bivariate level using Pearson product-moment correlation; at the multivariate level using hierarchical ordinary least squares regression; and at the structural level using maximum-likelihood structural equation modeling (SEM), complemented by bootstrap resampling (500 replications) and outlier-trimmed sensitivity regressions. The hierarchical regression model explained approximately 51.0 percent of the variance in enforcement outcomes (R² = 0.510, ΔR² = 0.505, F = 65.50, p < .001) after political will, institutional independence, and resource adequacy were entered, while socio-demographic covariates were non-significant. The structural model fit the data well (χ²(49) = 68.70, p = .033; CFI = 0.992; TLI = 0.989; RMSEA = 0.032; GFI = 0.973), and revealed that political will (β = 0.438,p < .001) and institutional independence (β = 0.337, p < .001) exerted statistically significant direct effects on enforcement outcomes, while institutional independence additionally exerted a significant indirect effect through resource adequacy (β = 0.572 on resource adequacy, and β = 0.206 from resource adequacy to enforcement outcomes, both p < .01). Bootstrap and trimmed-sample sensitivity checks confirmed the stability and robustness of all structural paths. The study concluded that enforcement outcomes in Uganda's anti-corruption system are jointly and significantly shaped by the willingness of political leadership to support enforcement and by the extent to which enforcement institutions operate free from undue interference, with adequate resourcing serving as a critical structural conduit through which independence translates into results.